{"id":131714,"date":"2012-09-04T10:00:28","date_gmt":"2012-09-04T14:00:28","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.prosebeforehos.com\/?p=131714"},"modified":"2012-12-26T16:03:42","modified_gmt":"2012-12-26T21:03:42","slug":"eu-screw","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.prosebeforehos.com\/article-of-the-day\/09\/04\/eu-screw\/","title":{"rendered":"Another Turn Of The Screw"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Article:<\/strong> Another Turn of the Screw<\/a> by Susan Watkins in The New Left Review.<\/p>\n

The Text:<\/strong> Not long ago depicted as a paragon of international virtues, the European Union has become synonymous with never-ending financial instability, the words \u2018euro\u2019 and \u2018crisis\u2019 now automatically conjoined. Anglo-Saxons are impatient: the US and UK have succeeded in shoring up their broken banks and rolling over their debts through state recapitalizations, bond purchases, money printing and devaluation; why can\u2019t Europe do the same? Merkel\u2019s government has been accused of failing to grasp that this is a banking crisis, not just one of sovereign debt. Headlines clamour for the adoption of the latest trans-Atlantic palliative: first bail-out loan funds, ECB bond purchases, quantitative easing; now direct lending to banks, deposit insurance, regional regulation and eurobonds, or issuance of collective debt. Germany, given leave in crisis conditions to assume an open leadership role in Europe\u2014a position the Maastricht Treaty was designed to neutralize\u2014has naturally asserted its own interests in the process of exercising its hegemony. Loth to become the guarantor of other states\u2019 bank and sovereign debt, it is determined to get as much as possible in exchange.<\/p>\n

But the new hegemon has been a lame one, as Perry Anderson has argued. [1] Berlin begrudges having to underwrite stop-gap measures to prop up the Eurozone\u2019s over-leveraged banks, and thereby British and US ones, via its debt-burdened states; but it is incapable of implementing a decisive alternative programme to restructure the unsustainable banking sector, rather than patch it up. The flawed design of the euro, a currency without an accountable sovereign state, is coming under intolerable pressure, as Michel Aglietta describes below. [2] But Europe\u2019s oligarchies baulk at the genuine political union\u2014a true democratic federation\u2014that NLR and others have historically championed. Germany\u2019s strategic aims in the crisis are more limited. It has fought for decades to safeguard its manufacturing base, battered (as was Japan\u2019s) by US exchange rates in the 1980s and now challenged by the rise of China. The geo-political dimension of European monetary union, as a prospective reserve currency to rival the dollar, will not be abandoned lightly; it was one reason for opening the Eurozone to so many peripheral economies, despite the core states\u2019 determination to avoid the federal social responsibilities that political union would bring. Berlin now aims to tighten the Eurozone system, to defend the gains it represents for Germany and to squeeze the bloc into a more competitive position vis-\u00e0-vis its rivals to the east and west. Beneath the hubbub of the headlines, this new European integration project is well underway. What political forms is it taking\u2014and what opposition is it likely to meet?<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Controls<\/strong><\/p>\n

As with earlier phases of European integration, the current one is structured by Community-level institutional design and nationally ratified treaties. But under conditions of emergency, it has involved more open political struggles between and within member states, as the scale of the transfer of wealth, from working populations to financial conglomerates, and of power, from economically weaker states to institutions controlled by stronger ones, becomes clear. The move was set in train with the European Financial Stability Facility in May 2010, its loans conditional on savage restructuring programmes dictated by officials of the European Commission, European Central Bank and IMF. The terms of the Troika\u2019s Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) are well known; their formulae typically assert: \u2018the amendments\u2019\u2014to amalgamate schools, reorganize local government, chop health spending, cut wages, etc.\u2014\u2018will be presented to Parliament in Quarter 3 and adopted by Quarter 4\u2019. Elected legislators in the target countries are reduced to clerks. [3] The European Stability Mechanism, currently being ratified by national parliaments, will turn this punitive emergency set-up into a permanent system. The ESM directorate will constitute an in-house IMF for the Eurozone, dictating macro-economic policy to states dependent on its loans. Underwritten in the final instance by Eurozone taxpayers (who also undertake to guarantee the interest payments and bankers\u2019 fees), the loans themselves will be raised on the international markets, as those of the EFSF have been. [4]<\/p>\n

The Fiscal Compact treaty, enshrining a balanced-budget rule in member states\u2019 constitutions, is designed to bolster the ESM \u2018from below\u2019. [5] Deficits must not be above 3 per cent of GDP, nor debt over 60 per cent. If the European Commission deems this breached, automatic correction measures will be implemented that need not be subject to parliamentary deliberation. The Fiscal Compact\u2019s economic effects are nugatory: the rule can be dodged if a parliamentary majority declares the country to be facing \u2018exceptional circumstances\u2019, or by employing Special Purpose Vehicles. Its importance is purely ideological, demonstrating that a member state is marching in line behind Berlin. Thus Zapatero and Rajoy scrambled to ram a constitutional amendment through Spain\u2019s Congreso de los Diputados at barely a week\u2019s notice in August 2011, only the second time the Constitution has been amended. Sarkozy had tried to push a Schuldenbremse through the French National Assembly the month before. There was ill-concealed impatience in Brussels and Berlin when the Irish government declared itself obliged to abide by its own constitution and put the Fiscal Compact to a popular vote. The arguments of the Yes camp amounted to dire threats of still harsher budgets cuts if voters delivered the wrong answer. When the referendum was carried, by an underwhelming 30 per cent of the electorate, Kenny rang Merkel directly\u2014so personalized has Eurozone decision-making become\u2014to beg for some debt relief as a reward. In true colonial fashion, it came as a pat on the head\u2014\u2018Ireland is considered a model bailout student\u2019\u2014and demand for payment in full. [6]<\/p>\n

Beyond this, designs are being drawn up by EC and ECB officials for a new Euro-group fiscal mechanism, headquartered in Luxembourg, and perhaps making some token nod to democratic principles through the inclusion on its board of the leader of the European Parliament, to control the issuance of new debt. [7] In essence this will take the form of an autocratic and asymmetrical oversight body, lacking any democratic accountability, to impose the diktats of northern states on the south. This is Berlin\u2019s condition for any future eurobonds. \u2018Control\u2019 is the key word in Merkel\u2019s pronouncements on this: \u2018Solidarity is possible only with serious controls and collective oversight\u2019\u2014\u2018you cannot have guarantees without control.\u2019 [8]<\/p>\n

The official architects of the new fiscal body are the ECB\u2019s Mario Draghi, European Commission chief Jos\u00e9 Manuel Barroso, Euro-Group chairman Jean-Claude Juncker and European Council president Hermann Van Rompuy. Their qualifications speak for themselves. Barroso had presided over the catastrophic collapse of the Portuguese economy, before gratefully accepting Blair\u2019s nomination to the EC in 2004 as a reward for services rendered on Iraq\u2014hosting the Azores summit in March 2003, from which Bush delivered the warmongers\u2019 ultimatum. Barroso spent the summer holidaying on the yacht of Spiro Latsis, a Greek shipping billionaire whose company soon after received the Commission\u2019s approval for state aid worth \u20ac10m. Draghi was famously a vice-chair for Europe at Goldman Sachs, a position that put him in charge of its \u2018companies and sovereigns\u2019 department, which shortly before his arrival helped Greece and its Central Bank governor Lucas Papademos disguise the state of its national accounts with derivative swaps on its sovereign debt; Draghi himself was an ardent proponent of governments\u2019 use of derivatives. Juncker is Prime Minister of Luxembourg, a duchy notorious for the light regulation of its financial companies, among them Clearstream, a Deutsche B\u00f6rse-owned clearing house with custody of \u20ac11 trillion of assets, and the subject of numerous money-laundering allegations, which the European Commission under Barroso has studiously refused to investigate. Van Rompuy, a right-wing Belgian Finance Minister in the 1990s, briefly in and out of the Prime Minister\u2019s chair, was the anyone-but-Blair candidate for the EU\u2019s unelected presidency, a relic of Giscard d\u2019Estaing\u2019s failed Constitution. His spectral presence testifies to the impasse of the Maastricht-model EU, swollen to an unwieldy 27 members, and the autonomous dynamic of the Eurozone.<\/p>\n

Values?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The upshot of these processes has been the abrogation of sovereignty in successive member states and its accumulation in Frankfurt, Brussels and Berlin. In place of the Treaty of Rome\u2019s \u2018ever-closer union of the peoples\u2019, it sets in place a series of structural inequalities between them. As Wolfgang Streeck has observed, the new integration drive represents an extension of the neo-functionalist \u2018spill-over\u2019 model:<\/p>\n

Monetary union, initially conceived as a technocratic exercise\u2014therefore excluding the fundamental questions of national sovereignty and democracy that political union would entail\u2014is now rapidly transforming the EU into a federal entity, in which the sovereignty and thereby democracy of the nation-states, above all in the Mediterranean, exists only on paper. Integration now \u2018spills over\u2019 from monetary to fiscal policy. [9]<\/p>\n

This process has given short shrift to the moral values cherished as its essence by the EU\u2019s publicists: post-national civilization, democratic principles, rule of law, \u2018European spirit\u2019. \u2018We could teach the neo-cons a thing or two about regime change\u2019, boasted one of Merkel\u2019s officials, having orchestrated Papandreou\u2019s resignation in November 2011 for having the temerity to suggest the Greek people be consulted on the Troika\u2019s Memorandum. Sounding like a mafia enforcer, Juncker explained, \u2018We made Papandreou aware of the fact that his behaviour is disloyal\u2019. [10] The \u2018non-political\u2019 ECB held off on Italian bond-buying to help precipitate Berlusconi\u2019s downfall. According to a top Italian official, Merkel and Sarkozy instructed Napolitano on whom to appoint in his stead. [11] \u2018There is no such thing any more as domestic policy making\u2019, Merkel announced. [12] As for the rule of law, the Fiscal Compact itself was declared operative if only twelve out of twenty-seven states ratified it, riding roughshod over the EU\u2019s own principles of unanimous ratification. To be \u2018pro-Europe\u2019 is now synonymous with favouring budget deficits below 3 per cent. [13]<\/p>\n

Putting paid to any illusions of post-nationalism, the Merkel government has sanctioned the crudest displays of chauvinism towards Greece, emulated by leaders in Finland and Austria. Trumpeted by the Springer press under the headline, \u2018Sell your islands, you bankrupt Greeks! And sell the Acropolis too!\u2019, the CDU\u2019s Josef Schlarmann explained: \u2018Those in insolvency have to sell everything they have to pay their creditors. Greece owns buildings, companies and uninhabited islands, which could all be used for debt redemption.\u2019 [14] The ironies of a German giving lessons in debt repayment have not been lost in Greece. Under the Nazi occupation, a hefty monthly payment was extracted from the Greek central bank to cover the Wehrmacht\u2019s expenses; in March 1942 an additional forced loan of 476 million Reichsmarks was levied by the Axis powers. Greek partisans put up some of the toughest military resistance to the Nazis in Europe; the damage wreaked by the occupiers\u2019 revenge was commensurate. Reprisals were exacted on the civilian population at a rate of fifty Greeks for every German killed. Much of the country\u2019s infrastructure was destroyed; forced exports and economic collapse helped bring about one of the worst famines in modern European history. [15] Nazi rule was followed by a three-year British and American counter-insurgency operation to stamp out the Communist-led partisans.<\/p>\n

After the War, ex-Nazi German leaders and their American conquerors were quick to salve their consciences by negotiating reparations for material damage with Israel; the Luxembourg Agreement was signed in 1952. The following year, the US, Britain and France wrote down the debts of their new Cold War ally and deferred the question of Second World War reparations until the two Germanies were re-unified. Greek claims were excluded from the 1990 \u20182+4\u2019 agreement on reparations signed by the Bonn and Berlin governments with Washington, Moscow, London and Paris. Legally, however, the RM476 million loan should count as credit, rather than war damage, and Greece is entitled to be repaid. Without interest, it would amount to $14 billion in today\u2019s money; with interest at 3 per cent over 66 years, over $95 billion. Since German reunification, Athens has made persistent attempts to table the question: the then Foreign Minister, Antonis Samaras, raised it with Hans-Dietrich Genscher in 1991, Andreas Papandreou with Kohl and Hartmann in 1995, Costas Simitis with Schroeder and Fischer in April 2000; in each case they met with peremptory German dismissal.<\/p>\n

In May and June this year the political pressure on Greeks to support pro-Memorandum parties in the elections, and threats of what would ensue if they returned a Syriza government, swelled to a campaign of international proportions. The loudspeakers of virtually the entire Western European media blared out the message that if Greeks dared to elect Syriza, they would be made to pay. Syriza, a Bennite grouping which insisted that austerity was not working, was dubbed \u2018anti-European\u2019 and its leader Alexis Tsipras universally described as \u2018exploiting\u2019 Greek anger. The German edition of the Financial Times published a page in Greek, headlined \u2018Resist the Demagogue\u2019\u2014\u2018It is only with parties that accept the conditions of international donors that your country will keep the euro . . . Resist the demagoguery of Alexis Tsipras and Syriza. Do not trust the promises that we can simply terminate the agreement, without consequences.\u2019 The London edition opined that the NPD\u2019s Samaras\u2014who had made the May 2012 elections a condition of joining Lucas Papademos\u2019s government in November 2011\u2014was insufficiently \u2018pro-European\u2019 and might need to be replaced as NPD leader. [16] A newly elected Fran\u00e7ois Hollande made clear on Greek TV what could be expected from Socialist France, \u2018warning\u2019 Greek voters:<\/p>\n

If the impression is given that the Greeks want to get away from the commitments that were made ??and abandon all prospect of recovery then there will be countries in the euro area who prefer to finish with the presence of Greece in the euro area. It is up to the Greeks . . . their choice is whether they want to stay in the euro area or not. It requires compliance with budgetary discipline and action for growth. [17]<\/p>\n

Fall out<\/strong><\/p>\n

What has been the political outcome of this strategy? In Greece, a \u2018national government\u2019 of the pro-Memorandum parties\u2014NPD, PASOK and DIMAR, a rightist split-off from Syriza\u2014rests on just 29 per cent of the electorate. In order to keep it in power, Hollande and other Euro-group leaders are already stressing the need to soften the MoU deadlines they had insisted Syriza respect. Elsewhere in the Eurozone\u2014Ireland, Portugal, Spain, France\u2014ejection of incumbents has become the order of the day. In some countries the two-party system\u2014or two-and-a-half parties, as in Ireland\u2014is starting to run out of rope: the anti-MoU Sinn Fein is around 18 per cent in the polls; in the Netherlands the Socialist Party, critical of austerity policies, has been running at 20 per cent. Turn-outs in elections across Europe are also falling markedly. The ESM is being ratified without referenda, but a more ambitious Euro-group fiscal body would not be able to escape a popular vote.<\/p>\n

At the time of writing, the Troika\u2019s super-sovereign status is being bitterly contested by Italy and Spain. Rajoy has hopes of getting a \u20ac100bn banking guarantee without strict EFSF conditions; different standards, it seems, apply to Portugal and to Spain, where the imposition of central rule on Autonomous Communities, not least the highly indebted Catalonia, is politically explosive. Monti has called for ECB bond purchases without the indignities of Troika diktat for \u2018well-behaved\u2019 countries like his own. What of France? Under Sarkozy, Paris gave unstinting support to Berlin; \u2018Nicolas will agree\u2019, as Merkel put it. [18] Hollande\u2019s Parti Socialiste now commands every level of the French political system: the Presidency, Senate, National Assembly, 21 out of 22 regions and large swathes of local government. During his campaign, Hollande spoke of re-negotiating the Fiscal Compact Treaty; but he made no move to put it to a referendum, contenting himself with getting existing EU funds redubbed as a growth package. It seems unlikely that France will offer a real lead to the Mediterranean bloc against Germany.<\/p>\n

Germany\u2019s first attempt to impose the Stability and Growth Pact on its fellow nations during the euro\u2019s early years famously foundered when it broke the rules itself in 2003. The L\u00e4nder and city states are already contesting the limits of the Fiscal Compact: North Rhine\u2013Westphalia, Berlin and Hamburg are set to out-borrow its constraints in 2012. With the world economy faltering, German attempts at austerity may backfire. In the 1990s, the IMF\u2019s high-handed structural adjustment programmes helped to make Latin America the vanguard continent for opposition to neo-liberalism. Syriza, only a fraction behind the NPD in the June 2012 election, has dispatched one of its leading economists to Buenos Aires to discuss Argentina\u2019s experience of default. Ecuador\u2019s successful debt audit\u2014opening the government\u2019s books and undertaking a democratic assessment of what was owed and what was \u2018odious\u2019\u2014offers further lessons. If the oligarchies that have run the EU since Maastricht have never won the active support of their populations for the direction of their rule, up till now they have not met any real political resistance. It remains to be seen whether this drastic new turn of the vice, in crisis conditions, can screw the popular will down again so easily.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Article: Another Turn of the Screw by Susan Watkins in The New Left Review. The Text: Not long ago depicted as a paragon of international virtues, the European Union has become synonymous with never-ending financial instability, the words \u2018euro\u2019 and \u2018crisis\u2019 now automatically conjoined. Anglo-Saxons are impatient: the US and UK have succeeded in […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":49,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[259],"tags":[],"yoast_head":"\nAnother Turn Of The Screw<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Until now, the oligarchies running the EU have met little political resistance. 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