Author Archive

The Motivations of Suicide Bombers

The Article: Study: Suicide bombers ‘not mentally unstable’ by Rhonda Spivak in Haaretz.

The Text: In an extensive study of Palestinian suicide bombings, three University of Toronto researchers have concluded that the bombers were not psychologically unstable and were often motivated by personal vengeance, not religious zeal.

The study was carried out by political sociologist Robert Brym, with the assistance of two Ph.d students, Palestinian Bader Araj and Israeli Yael Maoz-Shai.

Writing in the academic journal Social Forces, Brym noted, “The organizers of suicide attacks don’t want to jeopardize their missions by recruiting unreliable people. It may be that some psychologically unstable people want to become suicide bombers, but insurgent organizations strongly prefer their cannons fixed.”

He also found that the suicide bombers did not experience extraordinary high levels of economic deprivation.

Furthermore, in his study published in Contexts, Brym concluded that a majority of bombers, like Palestinian female lawyer, Hanadi Tayseer Jaradat, 29, who killed 21 civilians in a 2003 bombing at Maxim restaurant in Haifa, were “motivated by the desire for revenge and retaliation.”

Jaradat acted to avenge the killings of her brother, an Islamic Jihad militant, and cousin by Israeli security forces.

Brym concluded, “In its origins and at its core, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not religiously inspired, and suicide bombing, despite its frequent religious trappings, is fundamentally the expression of a territorial dispute.” Brym and Araj identified the organizational affiliation of 133 out of 138 suicide bombers between September 2000 and July 2005. Sixty-four per cent were affiliated with Islamic fundamentalists groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, while the rest were aligned with secular groups such as Fatah.

In analyzing data pertaining to Israeli counterterrorist operations, Brym said “we do know that of the nearly 600 suicide missions launched in Israel and its occupied territories between 2000 and 2005, fewer than 25 percent succeeded in reaching their target. Israeli counterterrorist efforts thwarted three-quarters of them using violent means.”

However, his study found that harsh repression can intensify bombings and prompt bombers to devise more lethal methods to achieve their aims.

“In general, severe repression can work for a while, but a sufficiently determined mass opposition will always be able to design new tactics to surmount new obstacles. One kind of ‘success,’ usually breeds another kind of ‘failure’ if the motivation of insurgents is high.” In an interview, Brym said: “I’m no fan of Hamas, but I believe that Israel and Hamas at some point have to sit and negotiate.”

In a paper to be published in Studies in Conflict on Terrorism this year, Araj concludes that harsh state repression “should not be perceived only as a reaction to suicide bombing” but “often precedes and is a major cause of suicide bombing.”

See Also: Afghanistan, A Costly Stalemate, Looms After 2008, Down syndrome al-Qaeda bomber story false, Suicide bomber kills senior Pakistani general in Rawalpindi, Death toll from Iraq pilgrim bombing rises to 63, Do yourself a favor, Threatened Mass Storming of Gaza Border Fizzles Out, Hamas accuses Abbas of playing role in Gaza closure, 50,000 to form human chain around Gaza in protest of Siege, and The Root of our Ills.

[tags]suicide bombing, haaretz, israel, palestine, terrorism, jihad, west bank, gaza, fatah, hamas, motivating factors, revenge, vengeance, sociology, psychology, mindset of terrorists, islam[/tags]

Email

A Statesmen Without Borders

The Article: A Statesman Without Borders by James Traub in today’s New York Times, on Bernard Kouchner, new foreign minister of France under Sarkozy’s presidency.

The Text: Bernard Kouchner, the foreign minister of France, has urged his country’s ambassadors to engage in ‘diplomacy in motion.’ Kouchner, who established the organization Médecins Sans Frontières 37 years ago; has had four or five careers since then; has often polled as the most popular politician in France; has written a dozen or so books; and once contemplated running for president of France, is himself the chief practitioner of this aerobic statecraft. So it was that at 6 a.m. on New Year’s Day, he and a few staff members gathered in the courtyard of the Quai d’Orsay, the headquarters of the foreign ministry, to drive to the airport for an overnight trip to Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. The goal, Kouchner explained, was to “bear witness to the solidarity” of the French people with the family of the former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, murdered the week before, and with democratic forces in Pakistan.

France has no historical relationship with Pakistan. What’s more, no other Western foreign minister was going. In fact, a few days earlier, Jean-David Levitte, foreign-affairs counselor to France’s president, Nicolas Sarkozy, told me how silly it was to expect Sarkozy to go to Pakistan for Bhutto’s funeral, as some critics were demanding. Pakistan was convulsed with violence, and its president, Pervez Musharraf, had “other things to do than to greet political leaders from all over the world to say, ‘Oh, we are in deep sorrow, all of us.’ ” But the 68-year-old Kouchner, who appears to have known everyone important, felt a personal bond with Bhutto, whom he first met in the late 1980s. And he convinced Sarkozy, himself very much a president in motion, that France needed to be more deeply engaged in a country crucial to the war on terror. And it would be: three weeks later, Musharraf would pay his first state visit to France.

Kouchner is a devotee of crisis, drama, danger — a résistant eager for an evil worth resisting. Half a century ago, as a cadre in the Communist student league, he threw pots of red ink at the United States Embassy in Paris to protest American imperialism. But he was too fond of girls and cafes to submit to revolutionary discipline. And his medical training disposed him to think more about individual people than about abstractions. Over time, like a number of European intellectuals, Kouchner migrated from the radical left to the antitotalitarian center. In 2003, he argued for a humanitarian intervention to oust Saddam Hussein. He is, by French standards, stoutly pro-American. On foreign policy, with only a few exceptions, he shares the views of the conservative Sarkozy. In less than a year, the two have torn France loose from its Gaullist moorings. They have, however, run into opposition at home; the French seem to be suffering from a serious case of motion sickness.

It is easy to make fun of French foreign policy, but not so easy to think what you would do if you were France. Europe’s other traditional great power, England, threw in its lot with its former colony across the pond. Germany, a 20th-century power, is largely shaped by “never again.” What, then, of France? After World War II, which precipitated the dissolution of its vast colonial empire — the last vestige of global power — France under Charles de Gaulle sought a new identity for itself by standing at a remove from the United States and the Atlantic alliance. De Gaulle removed France from NATO’s integrated command in 1966. (He suggested a ruling “Directorate” to consist of France, the U.K. and the U.S., but the Americans were not amused.) Since that time, French presidents of all parties have hewed to what Hubert Védrine, a former Socialist foreign minister, calls “the Gaullo-Mitterrandian-Chiracian consensus.” Védrine defines this consensus as “autonomy of decision” and “autonomy of thought.” France drew its own political map. The map was not so very different from the Italian or the German one, but the important thing was that it was theirs. The foreign policy of France, like its cuisine, should be unmistakably, ineffably . . . French.

However, the increasing integration of Europe and the globalization of so many formerly domestic issues have made specially flavored foreign policies increasingly quaint. And then President Bush’s my-way-or-the-highway approach reduced French policy in the last years of President Jacques Chirac to “the highway.” Chirac flatly refused to accept war in Iraq, hectored America’s allies in “new Europe” and shrugged at the prospect of an Iranian bomb. This began to feel, to the French themselves, less like a sign of independence than of rigor mortis. Between Chirac’s growing passivity and the haplessness of Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy, French policy diminished to a series of gestures. “From 2005 to 2007, there was no French foreign policy,” says Sophie Meunier, a scholar of international relations at Princeton. “France was completely sidelined.” By the time Sarkozy became president in the spring of 2007, you couldn’t see the autonomy of thought in Gaullism without a microscope.

During the campaign, Sarkozy sounded less like de Gaulle than like George Bush and Tony Blair, promising to “take the side of the oppressed” against “tyrannies and dictatorships” and scorning “the cultural relativism which holds that some people are not made for democracy.” Such was his instinctive contempt for the Gaullist consensus that he told a biographer he would like to raze the Quai d’Orsay. His views and temperament were oddly Kouchnerian. Christine Ockrent, Kouchner’s wife and one of France’s most admired journalists, told me, “The reason they get along so well, which is kind of surprising, is that they prefer action to theory.” They share a metabolic intolerance for the great French indoor sport of abstract speculation.

I first met Kouchner in September in New York, where he and Sarkozy had come for the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. The foreign minister had already delighted Washington, and infuriated his former Socialist colleagues — he was expelled from the party on joining Sarkozy’s government — by paying a very public visit to Iraq and by incautiously observing that Iran could bring a war on itself should it fail to comply with international inspections of its nuclear program. (Sarkozy slapped him down for that indiscretion.) We met at the apartment of Jean-Maurice Ripert, France’s ambassador to the U.N. and a member of the inner circle of Kouchner pals. Kouchner had just come in from jogging and was still wearing a mousy gray T-shirt, jeans and sneakers. He had slung himself sideways across an armchair, and as aides came in and out, he teased them, and they teased him back. They addressed one another by the familiar tu — an almost unheard-of liberty in the uppermost reaches of the French state. I later learned that Kouchner asks everyone in his cabinet to tutoyer him, though a veteran of the Quai told me that he insisted on addressing his boss as “Ministre,” not “Bernard.”

Kouchner had just come from Washington. “There is a change in the relationship,” he said. “It’s not the return of France to the U.S., but the return of confidence between France and the U.S.” Important disagreements remained, but he had told Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “I will never betray you” — a blunt reference to January 2003, when Dominique de Villepin, then foreign minister, shocked Rice’s predecessor, Colin Powell, by abruptly announcing that France would never support an invasion of Iraq. Kouchner insisted his widely covered visit to Iraq in August was not done “to support the U.S.,” but rather “because the international community together must act in Iraq.” Like Sarkozy, Kouchner speaks of returning France to the heart of Europe and Europe to the heart of the Western alliance; but on Iraq he hasn’t made much headway among his fellow foreign ministers, or even his own colleagues. “They believe that I am an unguided missile,” he fumed. “They believe that I’m a foolish guy. ‘Why is this stupid Kouchner going to Iraq? We don’t care about Iraq!’ They are stupid. They don’t know that the core of the danger is there, in between Iraq and Iran, in between Lebanon and Syria. This is the common enemy, not only for Americans but for all democracies. And the common enemy is extremism.”

But there was no mistaking the message to the White House: Sarkozy had not only told the French how much he loved American culture; he had infuriated the anti-Americans by taking his summer vacation in New England, and then, worse still, downing hot dogs with George Bush in Kennebunkport. He took a hard line on Iran and terrorism. And he had chosen Kouchner, who had earned contempt and even hatred at home for aiding and abetting the American cause, and for denouncing protestors who, to him, seemed to prefer Saddam Hussein to George Bush.

Kouchner cut an exotic swath through New York and Washington over the course of the following week. Though his revolutionary politics have long since evaporated, Kouchner retains from the early ’60s a Dada sense of the ludicrousness of the postures of authority. At the Council on Foreign Relations he delivered a speech that was rendered semi-incomprehensible by his wholly personal brand of English pronunciation. When the question-and-answer session began, the moderator, Felix Rohatyn, himself a former ambassador to France, politely asked Kouchner whom he was making faces at. Kouchner was, in fact, sticking out his tongue at Richard Holbrooke, the diplomat, who was whispering loudly to his companion. Several days later, at a U.N. press conference, the correspondent for Al Jazeera taxed Kouchner with having said that France was preparing for war in Iran. “Who said France is going to war?” Kouchner cried, peering into the crowd. “You.” He began advancing toward the reporter, waving his arms (and smiling) and saying, “With your big mustache and your big eyes, I’m not threatened by you.” It was hard to say if the French foreign minister was amusing himself or was unhinged.

For Kouchner, the spontaneous gesture and the tutoyer are not only jokes at the expense of French formalism; they are part of his method. “His meetings are what we in France call ‘happenings,’ ” an aide said to me. “It’s very ’68. Every idea, no matter how weird it could be, is flying across the room. It’s a bit longer, but it’s more creative — more ideas are blossoming.” A few days after taking office last May, Kouchner summoned his aides to the Quai on a Saturday to talk about Darfur. They were shocked to find a room packed with human rights activists, whom Kouchner invited as well. A happening ensued. Kouchner suggested that the West establish “humanitarian corridors,” as it had in Bosnia, to take supplies to refugees inside Sudan — an idea “beautiful in its grandeur but entirely impractical,” according to John Prendergast, an Africa expert who is a chairman of Enough, which campaigns against genocide. After stubbornly defending his inspiration over the next month or so, Kouchner eventually admitted he was wrong and embraced a plan proposed by the Chirac government to post a European-led peacekeeping force on the Chadian side of the border, in order to protect refugee camps and prevent the violence from spreading farther. He then tirelessly promoted his new idea with aid groups and the European Union.

And now, in New York, Sarkozy, who was leading a Security Council session on Africa, was about to largely close the deal on the peacekeeping force. The French president was thus able to show that he meant what he said about taking human rights seriously, and about charting a new direction. In years past, Prendergast observes, for all their magnificent rhetoric, the French had sided with the spoilers on Sudan more often than with the activists. Now, he says, “I’m encouraged across the board with the effort they’ve made.”

The vast and imposing headquarters of the French foreign ministry was built by the Emperor Napoleon III in the middle of the 19th century. Hussars in white cutaways silently patrol the hallways, opening doors with a little bow and pouring pink Champagne into crystal glasses at official functions. The foreign minister is quartered in a splendid salon that looks out over the lawn of an inner courtyard. The walls are lined with a series of 18th-century Gobelin tapestries depicting Roman gods, and six crystal chandeliers hang from the foggy heights of the ceiling. It is a setting designed to evoke the majesty, the antiquity and the elegance of French diplomacy.

Bernard Kouchner is not quite so unsuited to this awe-inspiring milieu as might first appear. He is a man of no little elegance himself, a fastidious and even dandyish dresser who knows how to wear his scarf just so, or even his cape. When the steward on the flight back from Islamabad brought the wine for dinner, Kouchner said: “What? No Batailley?” He had run through the stock of his favorite wine and had to make do with a lesser château. Kouchner is, in demographic terms, what the French call gauche caviar — an upper-bourgeois lefty. He was raised in Paris, the son of a doctor. In the early ’60s, Kouchner and his pals would crank out polemics for Clarté, the young Communists’ house organ, and then repair for a night of genteel riot at Balzar, the restaurant frequented by Sartre and his circle. There was a more proletarian hangout nearby, but Kouchner preferred the conversation and the women — “superbes” — at Balzar.

Still, Kouchner was no fop. His grandfather was a Jewish émigré who came to France in 1908. Kouchner’s father and uncles, he has proudly said, were a tough bunch. He inherited their pugnacity, as well as a dockworker’s chin and a boxer’s flattened features. Born in 1939, Kouchner also inherited a view of history as tragedy. Kouchner’s father’s parents perished at Auschwitz. The war, and the Holocaust, shaped him deeply. Kouchner has said, in a book-length conversation with Daniel Cohn-Bendit, another former hero of the left, “I’ve long wondered how, under Nazism, so many Jews allowed themselves to be led away, though some of them knew — even if they could not bring themselves to believe it — that they were going to their death.” Children of Kouchner’s generation, and especially Jewish children, grew up in a world whose twin poles were collaboration and resistance. Kouchner always knew what he wanted to be when he grew up — a résistant.

Life afforded Kouchner a series of glamorous and romantic settings for the drama of resistance. He stood shoulder to shoulder with the other young Communists protesting the war in Algeria and singing about the liberation of the workingman. He made a name for himself as an upstart journalist. “I am a Communist and Rastignac,” the 23-year-old Kouchner wrote with supreme provocation, referring to Balzac’s arriviste hero, Eugène de Rastignac, desperate to thrive in the Paris beau monde. Kouchner was already a fixture in the Latin Quarter, amusing himself at the expense of the humorless left. He and his friends, anti-Stalinists all, took on the party leadership and were duly expelled from the youth league. But Kouchner was ambitious and careful to make friends as well as enemies. In 1964 he and the Clarté crowd went to Cuba; Kouchner spent the night fishing and drinking with Fidel Castro (and, he says, urging Castro to legitimize his position with a democratic election). And somehow, on the side, he was training to be a doctor.

Kouchner’s life took a decisive turn in 1968 when he answered a call from the Red Cross for doctors to go to Biafra, a breakaway province of Nigeria fighting a savage war of independence. Here was horrific suffering, mortal peril, desperate need; Kouchner, a fearless figure besotted with heroism and danger, had found his vocation. But the Red Cross believed in treatment, not resistance; Kouchner and his friends were not permitted to speak publicly about what they viewed as state-sponsored genocide — a re-enactment of passivity before the Holocaust. Back in Paris, Kouchner circulated a statement condemning Nigeria. Sartre and de Beauvoir and the others signed. And he and his fellow doctors, now a brotherhood sealed in blood, formed an organization to take emergency care to places racked by violence or natural disasters. In 1971, the group was christened Médecins Sans Frontières — Doctors Without Borders. The name itself was a provocation: They would not be deterred by borders, or by the will of states, or by the Red Cross code of silence. M.S.F. was something genuinely new and enormously glamorous — a fearless band of radical humanitarians. In his book “Power and the Idealists,” Paul Berman describes the group as “a sort of medical wing to the worldwide guerrilla movement.”

But the medical commitment to treatment could not be reconciled for long with revolutionary ideology, for so many of the victims were suffering at the hands of left-wing regimes. Kouchner, though raised in the bosom of Communism and afterward a dedicated socialist, insisted that the reality of suffering must supersede ideology. In 1979, he chartered a ship to rescue thousands of people who had set off in leaky boats in the South China Sea to flee the Communist government in Vietnam. The project was denounced by much of the left, for whom human misery was no match for ideological clarity. A leading figure inside M.S.F. even wrote a screed against “the boat for St. Germain des Prés” — the Paris neighborhood that was headquarters for the gauche caviar. But Kouchner, by then a dazzling figure in French public life, pulled the threads of all his networks and got a call to action signed by Sartre, Michel Foucault, Eugène Ionesco, Yves Montand, Simone Signoret and Brigitte Bardot. Sartre and Kouchner were photographed with Raymond Aron, France’s leading conservative intellectual. The doctrine of “humanitarian action” trumped ideology — an astonishing moment in European intellectual circles. “It was the end of the cold war in our heads,” says the philosopher André Glucksmann, a great friend of Kouchner.

It was also the end of Kouchner’s career with M.S.F. In the midst of a tumultuous meeting in May 1979, Kouchner and his pals walked out rather than stage an ugly fight for control. Almost 30 years later, the issue is still so clouded by personal bitterness and ideological rivalry that it’s impossible to say for sure what happened. Glucksmann says that Kouchner was ousted by rightists. Patrick Aeberhard, an original M.S.F. doctor, ascribes the split chiefly to jealousy of Kouchner and disgust with his “very strong ego.” On the other hand, Rony Brauman, later the head of the organization, says that Kouchner wanted to keep M.S.F. as a kind of pickup group of friends while others wanted it to mature into a more professional body. And the founder, he said, could not be reasoned with. “Kouchner is a kind of emotional Stalinist,” Brauman says. “You either support him or you’re against him. To disagree is to attack him. And when you attack him, you become jealous, mediocre, a bureaucrat.”

One evening in Paris, I told Kouchner about my conversation with his rival. Our bantering stopped cold. “Brauman is an insignificant figure!” Kouchner snapped. You had to conclude that some wounds may never heal.

After the 1979 split, Kouchner and his loyalists went on to create their own organization, Médecins du Monde. Owing, perhaps, to the founder’s allergy to bureaucracy, the organization never achieved anything like the scope of Médecins Sans Frontières, which would later win the Nobel Peace Prize.

Late one morning last October, I was in Paris waiting for Kouchner to return from a European Union meeting in Lisbon when his spokesman called to say that the minister had decided instead to fly to Beirut, with his Spanish and Italian counterparts, to try to advance the stalled process of choosing a new Lebanese president. If I left the next morning for Lisbon, I could fly with Kouchner to Lebanon. (This was slightly more advance warning than I later got for Islamabad.) The next afternoon I boarded the small government jet Kouchner had requisitioned. He and his aides had been up until 2 the night before hammering out the last details of the new, simplified European Union treaty that Sarkozy had made a chief objective. They were in a triumphant mood.

Kouchner claims to know pretty much everything and everyone by heart. One of Rony Brauman’s jokes is, “The guy must be four or five hundred years old; he’s spent 30 years in every critical situation worldwide.” But in Lebanon, at least, it was true. He had been going there since 1975, when he, Aeberhard and others established a hospital in Nabaa, a poor Shiite neighborhood, in the midst of the civil war. He knew all the Shiite leaders and often their fathers and brothers; and the Sunnis and Christians as well. “We embrace each other, we tutoie each other, we are angry at each other, we hold hands, we joke, we say ‘shut up’ to each other,” Kouchner explained to me on the plane. Lebanon’s Christian army had “designated me for death,” as he liked to remind the Christian warlords. These rivals, who were barely talking to one another, would speak to him without posturing, he said. Kouchner felt that he could make a difference. Then again, Kouchner almost always feels that he can make a difference.

We arrived at night and drove straight to a charming seaside restaurant, where a big dinner had been arranged with “civil society” — that is, Kouchner’s friends. The minister sat across from the brother of Nabih Berri, who is the speaker of Lebanon’s Parliament and leader of the Shiite group Amal, and next to an extremely beautiful young French civil-society something, and they toasted one another with arrack. A Shiite wedding was being held in a banquet hall nearby, and Kouchner led us over there. The bride and her bridesmaids, in fabulous evening gowns and ample cleavage, welcomed the minister and had him join them in a dance, which in Kouchner’s case involved jumping up and down and shouting enthusiastically. Lebanon seemed like a wonderful country.

The next day, Kouchner visited the cemetery in which the latest assassinated Lebanese legislator had been buried and then flew by helicopter to the arid southern region where 1,600 French troops were serving with a U.N. peacekeeping force. He reminded them that France, which had brought this fragmented country into being, had a special responsibility for its fate, and also that the Shiites, now seen in the West as the chief obstacle to peace owing to the role of Hezbollah, had in fact been scorned and neglected for decades and had legitimate grievances that would have to be addressed. Kouchner then returned to Beirut with the Spanish and Italian ministers for negotiating sessions with each of the country’s factions. That night the three held a press conference at which Kouchner spoke hopefully and passionately of a new spirit of cooperation between the Christian and Shiite factions. At least, he said, they had stopped insulting each other. By midnight, we were flying back to Paris.

What was accomplished? A Kouchner aide told me that Nabih Berri was now far more open to a “consensus” candidate to replace the departing president than he was before. The Christians — from whose ranks, according to Lebanese law, the president would be chosen — had also agreed to select someone acceptable to the Shiite opposition. On the flight home, at 2:30 in the morning, Kouchner told me that he had reminded them all that the alternative to compromise was yet another spiral of violence that he, and they, knew so well. But he also assured them that if they could elect a president before the Annapolis conference on Middle East peace in late November, “it would change everything; it will make the Middle East move toward a dimension, not of conflict or violence but, if I daresay, of democracy and constitutionalism.”

Here was another vision beautiful in its grandeur. In the event, of course, the factions didn’t compromise, and Annapolis produced no breakthroughs. Kouchner, the minister without borders, kept going back to Beirut, coaxing and hand holding and telling his friends to shut up. The effort felt Sisyphean. Professionals in the Quai d’Orsay worried that their boss was so in love with crisis that he was ignoring subjects that bored him, like reintegration into NATO. Worse still, in early November, Sarkozy sent Jean-David Levitte and his own chief adviser, Claude Guéant, to Damascus to ask the Syrian president, Bashar Assad, to use his considerable influence with the Lebanese opposition to break the stalemate. Until that moment, the French had refused to deal with the Syrian regime, which they blamed for the murder of Rafik Hariri, Lebanon’s former prime minister, and other Lebanese leaders. Kouchner, who viewed the Syrians as ruthless killers, was incensed and humiliated. His Lebanese interlocutors felt betrayed. And the bid failed utterly, just as Kouchner predicted. It was a fiasco for French diplomacy, confirmed when Sarkozy announced in December that he was breaking off talks with Damascus.

When I spoke to Kouchner later and asked if the failure in Lebanon showed the limits of his brand of intimate diplomacy, he said, “Sorry, no, on the contrary, the problem is to not play the game my people have been playing in Damascus.” The problem, he said, was “Élysée” — the president’s office. Not Levitte — “he was in agreement with me.” I told him that I had just had spoken with Levitte, who said that Sarkozy authorized the trip only after Saad Hariri, Rafik’s son and the leader of the so-called March 14 majority coalition, agreed that he should do so.

“This is a loyal guy,” Kouchner shot back, referring to Levitte. “He knew that I was right.” Kouchner was implying that the problem in fact lay with Guéant, who was now emerging as an unexpected rival. “It’s always the same game with them. It’s a problem of experience. Those who know, know.”

One evening in 1985, Kouchner was having dinner with an old friend, Mario Bettati, a professor of law, and complaining that international law, by treating borders as inviolable, erected frustrating and morally insupportable barriers to his work. How, he asked, can you change international law in order to establish the right to cross borders to help the suffering, whether the state in question wants it or not? Bettati explained that Kouchner would have to enlist the French government — President François Mitterrand and Prime Minister Chirac. So, Kouchner responded, “Let’s write to them.” If you’re Bernard Kouchner, this leads to the happening of all happenings. For three days in January 1987, the French universe gathered in the ballroom of the Meridien in Paris to discuss “Humanitarian Rights and Principles.” All the intellectuals were there, from left and right, and Yves Montand and Constantin Costa-Gavras — and, incredibly, Mitterrand and Chirac, a thoroughly pragmatic pair of politicians who recognized a movement they needed to get in front of. Kouchner spent the previous months explaining that, as Bettati says, “it was scandalous to let people die because they were 200 meters beyond the border and we are not allowed to go over the border to save them.” Few at the Hotel Meridien were inclined to disagree. Bettati, at Kouchner’s instruction, drew up a statement laying out a right of “humanitarian access,” read it out to the crowd and then passed it to Chirac, who vowed to take the text to the United Nations.

The U.N. is a club of states, and its charter was always understood to protect states from interference in their domestic affairs. Kouchner, however, was only proposing that doctors and aid workers be granted the right to deliver emergency aid. After a year’s worth of persuasion, the General Assembly recognized this limited right in December 1988. And in 1991, when Kouchner and others dramatized the plight of Iraqi Kurds fleeing attack by Saddam Hussein, the Security Council authorized a massive humanitarian effort to cross into Iraqi territory to alleviate Kurdish suffering. Humanitarian access proved to be the thin edge of the wedge. Years later, with the Balkans and Rwanda in mind, Kofi Annan, the secretary general of the U.N., began talking about a right of humanitarian intervention in the case of atrocities. In 2005, the General Assembly adopted what came to be known as “the responsibility to protect.”

This doctrine of intervention — ingérence in French — capped decades of thinking and acting that had begun with the team of young doctors in Biafra, though ultimately it drew on a far wider range of actors. This “grand-scale alternative view of world politics,” as Paul Berman calls it, held out the possibility that Western power, the bane of the left, “could do a world of good for the most oppressed of the oppressed.” For Kouchner, ingérence was the answer to the terrible question raised by the Holocaust. When pressed about the real value of the doctrine he had fathered, he invariably said: It has made Auschwitz less likely. At the same time, Kouchner knows all too well that no one, including the French, lifted a finger to stop the genocide in Rwanda and that the janjaweed continue to have a free hand in Darfur. “Of course,” he said to me one evening in his melodramatic cadences, “it’s always too late, it’s always too late. These are the childhood sins of the right of ingérence. Soon, one day, there will be a world government; we’re not there yet, maybe in two centuries there will be a world government that won’t let these things be done.” Yes, history is tragic; but Kouchner has optimism in the glands. His wife, Christine Ockrent, cites an expression attributed to the Italian political thinker Antonio Gramsci: pessimism of the mind, optimism of the will.

Kouchner served in Mitterrand’s government from 1988 to 1992 as minister for humanitarian action, a position he treated essentially as Médecins Sans Frontières with a government seal. Name a disaster area — Lebanon, Iran, Liberia, Kurdistan, Somalia, Bosnia — and he was there, surrounded by a nimbus of reporters. In his single greatest coup, in June 1992, Kouchner persuaded Mitterrand to board a secret flight to Sarajevo in order to force the Serbs then besieging the country to open up the airport to humanitarian flights. The Serbs had parked their tanks on the runway, and the tiny U.N. force was helpless to move them off. “It was seen as a totally hopeless endeavor,” recalls Fabrizio Hochschild, one of the few civilian U.N. officials in the city at the time. Then a French officer announced that Mitterrand would be landing on the runway that night. Panic, shouting, desperate phone calls to Paris. A helicopter lands — it’s Kouchner! And reporters from Paris Match and Agence France-Presse. The next helicopter holds le président. Kouchner introduces him to all the players. Mitterrand demands an airlift to save the besieged city. The news flashes around the world. The Serb tanks rumble off the runway, and a few dozen U.N. troops secure the airport. Kouchner becomes a hero and Mitterrand’s pet. “Of course it was a high-profile, media-oriented event,” Hochschild says. “But it was the only thing that worked.”

But did it work? The U.N. stumbled backward into Bosnia, dispatching a force to protect the airlift, which stood by as the Serbs continued to pound Sarajevo and other major towns, which led to the disastrous “safe havens” policy and the massacre at Srebrenica and, finally, terribly late, a NATO bombing campaign. Mitterrand proved wholly unwilling to stand up to the Serbs, with whom he sympathized. Should we not, therefore, look beyond this heroic intervention to the sickening quandary that succeeded it? David Rieff (a contributing writer to this magazine) argues as much in his book “A Bed for the Night,” an all-out attack on humanitarianism as a guide to political action. The terrible consequences, it’s true, were unforeseeable at the time, and the Bosnians were surely better off with the airlift than they would have been without it. Nevertheless, the episode serves as a reminder that the intensely politicized humanitarianism that Kouchner virtually invented does not, in fact, have the same moral status as resistance to fascism. It involves hard choices; and sometimes the choices may be wrong.

Kouchner, as a doctor, wanted to alleviate suffering; but, as a politician, he also wanted his actions to be exemplary. His motto was “Concept and action, here and there.” And so in late 1992, as Somalia was engulfed in clan violence, which in turn resulted in mass starvation, Kouchner and Jean-Maurice Ripert, then his chief of staff, mounted a campaign among French schoolchildren to collect rice for the Somalis and raise awareness of the mass suffering. They collected 15,000 tons of rice, filled a cargo ship and sent it off to Mogadishu. When the rice finally arrived, Kouchner obliged the news photographers by carrying a sack of rice up the beach — once, twice, three times, until the shot was just right. The press treated the incident as indecent showboating; the sac de riz became Kouchner’s albatross. And yet it’s hard to see the difference between Kouchner at his worst and at his best. He and his circle are still bitter about the incident. “Where were you when we were bringing rice to Somalia?” Ripert asks of his critics. “What were you doing? Nothing? Then shut up.”

There was a very Kouchnerian aftermath. “We tried to get some international troops,” recalls Ripert, “and we could not convince anyone. One night we were drinking whiskey in a bar in St. Germain des Prés, and Kouchner said, ‘That’s enough; I have to call the president.’ It was one of those French cafes where you had the phone near the toilet. He tried to reach the President from this phone, and he could not. So he reached Védrine, who at the time was chief of staff, and he was noncommittal. And the next morning he called up the State Department and said, ‘The French don’t want to do this, so you have to go in.’ ” Ripert gives Kouchner credit for provoking President George H. W. Bush to send American troops to Somalia, which constitutes something of a revisionist view of history.

Kouchner, by then very much a politician, spent the two years after 1992 as minister of health, then in 1994 he was elected to the European Parliament. He again served as France’s minister of health from 1997 to 1999, when Kofi Annan made him special representative for Kosovo, which NATO troops entered only weeks before. For the one and only time in his life, Kouchner got to be head of a country, albeit one that didn’t exist, with rampant crime and violence, no social services and a multinational army that wasn’t supposed to fight. Kouchner, as always, managed to make the whole enterprise feel exhilarating. He surrounded himself with dashing French buddies and a few reformed ’68ers, and the besieged little group drank bad Macedonian wine until late in the night. Less debonair people took a decidedly negative view of Kouchner’s tenure. An American consultant who worked with Kouchner found him “wildly disorganized” and unequal to the demands of running even a rump state. A French journalist then quartered in Pristina says, “Once the international media went away, he became bored by Kosovo.” But others who expected to find a preening media star say they were struck by Kouchner’s seriousness of purpose.

Kouchner’s strongest defender may be Jock Covey, a U.N. official who was his deputy, responsible for making Kosovo actually function. Working with Kouchner, Covey says, was thrilling. At one point a Serb leader enraged by continual attacks from the Albanian majority was threatening to wreck the agreements that preserved a tenuous peace between them. “The more threatening he got,” Covey recalls, “the more Kouchner leaned forward.” Finally Kouchner leaned all the way across the table and shouted: “Who do you think you are, threatening us? Pretending to be radical? I am radical! I was on the barricades before you were born. And I have never left the barricades!” The Serb was unnerved and backed down. It was true, Covey said, that Kouchner raced across town every time he heard a fire engine. But he had a doctor’s gift for comforting the afflicted and a politician’s gift for getting people who hated each other to talk. Covey says he came to recognize that “simply being present is important in itself. People saw him, as they didn’t see his successors.” When I visited Kosovo in 2004, the only U.N. representative whom the Albanians seemed to remember fondly, and viewed as their advocate, was Kouchner.

After Kosovo, Kouchner hoped for another big U.N. job, and he set his cap for the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. But the Chirac government gave him tepid support. Seemingly unembarrassable, he then rejoined the government as minister of health, a job he had already held, in one form or another, twice before. He spent a year at Harvard, and then returned to his humanitarian work. In 2005, he began preparing a run for president. He wrote a book of pensées with the puckish title “Two or Three Things I Know About Us” and began holding town-hall meetings across France with the hope of rousing an independent movement. But he had no money and no organization; even Christine Ockrent admits that political campaigning is not her husband’s strong suit. Kouchner wound up halfheartedly supporting Ségolène Royal, who was seeking nomination as the Socialist candidate, and threw himself into a campaign to become the head of the World Health Organization. This, too, failed. Kouchner was at sixes and sevens. Then President Sarkozy called.

When Kouchner first learned that Benazir Bhutto had been assassinated, he wanted to rush to Pakistan right away. But Sarkozy had scheduled a state visit to Egypt, and Kouchner had to stay put until the end of December. On the flight to Islamabad, he explained to me that France’s commitment to the future of Afghanistan, which Sarkozy had underscored by promising to keep troops in the NATO peacekeeping force, gave it an important stake in Pakistan’s stability and in the fate of democracy there. He conceded that Bhutto herself was highhanded and feudal and that she was widely considered corrupt. But she was beautiful and brave, he believed, and carried the hopes for a better Pakistan. He wanted to fly to the family seat in Larkana and visit her grave site, although Musharraf might block him, as he had others. “I could be defeated,” Kouchner said grandly, “but not the spirit of France.” Since Paris has backed President Musharraf almost as unstintingly as Washington has, the spirit Kouchner was channeling may well have been his own.

Kouchner held a series of meetings the day after he arrived. At a breakfast with several political-party leaders, he gave the impression that France was plunged into mourning by Bhutto’s death. “We were more than shocked by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto,” he declared. “We were devastated.” He suggested the parties publish a joint statement in newspapers all over the world condemning the murder. But he also cut them off when they began declaiming about the peaceful message of the Koran and urged them not to blame the Americans for everything.

Kouchner then held an hourlong conversation with Musharraf that was described to me as amiable, expansive and not terribly productive. Musharraf insisted that it was too dangerous to go to Larkana; and that was that.

Kouchner had lunch with leaders of Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party at the French Embassy. Their bitterness and rage, six days after their leader’s death, were still fresh. They were convinced that Musharraf’s government was linked to Bhutto’s assassination and gave Kouchner a lengthy forensic analysis featuring the trajectory of brain matter. He tried to talk them down: “Would it be possible to believe that Musharraf betrayed Bush by organizing her death or not doing enough to protect her?” Yes, it would. “O.K.,” Kouchner said, “but what am I supposed to do?” He promised to call Condoleezza Rice and David Miliband, his British counterpart, to press for an independent inquiry.

Kouchner was not about to leave Pakistan without honoring Bhutto’s memory. He resolved to lay a wreath at the impromptu shrine at the site of her murder. The Pakistanis tried to block that too, but the French delegation went ahead with the plan, and they alerted news organizations in Islamabad. Kouchner drove to the site, shoved his way through a huge crowd of photographers and placed a wreath beneath a giant poster of the fallen leader. “In the name of the French Republic and the president of France and the European Union” — Kouchner translated his own ringing phrases into English as he went — “I pay respect to the remains of a fighter for democracy and freedom. . . . ” Larkana would have been a more dramatic setting, but Kouchner had made his point, and made it in front of the national and global media: France, and the West, would not stand by while democracy was snuffed out in Pakistan. Or that was the idea, anyway.

Kouchner says he believes that he and Sarkozy have restored France’s claim to political and moral leadership — not by the old Gaullist conjuring trick of “autonomy of decision” but by placing the core values of democracy and human rights at the heart of policy. But the French are far more comfortable with, or at least accustomed to, Gaullist realism; and, at least in the cafes and parlors of Paris, Kouchner is routinely tarred as a “neoconservative.” This term, which has virtually replaced “fascist” as the epithet of choice on the left, more or less means “one who wishes to use the instruments of state to promote values,” though of course, post-2003, it carries the whiff of “warmonger” and “American lackey.” Kouchner did, in fact, envision a humanitarian intervention in Iraq, blessed by the U.N., as the supreme achievement of the doctrine of ingérence. But he is far more critical of the Bush administration than are friends of his like André Glucksmann. He speaks of postwar Iraq as an unmitigated and wholly avoidable catastrophe, and he is quite open about preferring his friend Condi to Vice President Dick Cheney, who he says “is responsible for a lot of mistakes.” He is more careful about George Bush, whom he seems to view as an honest, if befuddled, figure.

Kouchner is also damned as a hypocrite and a dupe. Sarkozy has been far more dry-eyed on human rights than his stirring campaign rhetoric implied. In recent months, he has received Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi and Hugo Chávez at the Élysée and congratulated Vladimir Putin on his deeply undemocratic victory in legislative elections. The writer and philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy, a regular in the Kouchner circuit who has nevertheless preserved his ties to the left, has taken to lambasting Kouchner and Sarkozy in the press. Even Glucksmann, who voted for Sarkozy and viewed him as a warrior for human rights, said publicly that he could not fathom the courtship of Putin.

I asked Kouchner if he felt discomfort or anxiety over Sarkozy’s dalliance with autocrats. “Discomfort, yes,” he said. “Anxiety, no.” When Kouchner went to Russia, he talked to dissidents and civil-society groups and publicly criticized Putin, and so had Sarkozy — a sharp break from the Chirac era. But there was a reality principle that the human rights community wouldn’t recognize. “They have to protest; that is their role,” Kouchner said. “That was my job during 35 years. Now I’m in charge of some particular job. We have to say, ‘Sorry, yes, yes, yes,’ and to listen to them. This is not the same thing as the president of France! He has to shake Putin’s hand. Of course! Otherwise, you send the Charles de Gaulle” — France’s only battleship — “or what? Ridiculous!”

Kouchner says he doesn’t read articles critical of him, but he obviously absorbs their gist quite thoroughly. He was disgusted with Lévy, and he was disgusted with the Socialists who treated Sarkozy’s invitation to Qaddafi as an affront to human dignity. Sarkozy’s intercession with Qaddafi, after all, led to the release of Bulgarian nurses who had been sentenced to death. And the Libyan leader was trying to play a positive role in the Middle East.

For Kouchner, all this is part of the same battle he’s been waging with the left since he started picking up boat people in Vietnam: “Are they concerned about victims? No, they are not. They were not. The first slogan before the creation of M.S.F. was ‘There are no good and bad victims.’ For them, bad victims exist.” Abstractions mattered more than people. It was, in other words, something Kouchner — and not only Kouchner, perhaps — disliked about the French.

The issue that the French find most entertaining to debate about Kouchner is: Does he matter? One line of argument runs that while Kouchner gets to do the hot spots — Darfur, Lebanon, Kosovo — Sarkozy turns to Levitte when it comes to great-power diplomacy. And the Syrian misadventure implies that Kouchner can’t even exercise control over the hot spots. Pierre Haski, director of Rue89, a left-leaning French foreign-affairs Web site, calls Kouchner “the weakest minister of foreign affairs in memory, except for Douste-Blazy.” Even some of Kouchner’s own aides aren’t yet sure how broad his remit will be. A senior figure said he told Kouchner that if he kept blurting out whatever was on his mind, “the other ministers aren’t going to take you seriously.” What’s more, he said, Kouchner loves “crisis management” and is bored by details. He worried that Kouchner’s inattention to more complicated issues would create a vacuum that other ministers would be only too happy to fill.

Our 13-hour flight from Islamabad reached Paris a little past 2 a.m. Kouchner offered to drop me off at my apartment. He went through a stack of papers in the back seat of his car; but he would almost always rather talk than read. The next day, he said, he would try to persuade Sarkozy, Rice and Miliband to back an independent inquest into Bhutto’s death. “Condi is not too enthusiastic,” Kouchner admitted; but he needed her to lean on Musharraf. I asked who would conduct the investigation. It couldn’t be the U.N., since the assassination had no international dimension. Kouchner had decided to propose the European Union, even though the body had no institutional capacity for judicial inquiries, and Musharraf would likely throw a fit. This may have been another idea beautiful in its grandeur.

I asked Kouchner if he had accomplished what he hoped to accomplish in Islamabad. “Yes, but it’s only the beginning,” he said as we drove through the silent streets of Paris. “What matters is that we are back in Pakistan. And we are back in the Middle East and in the gulf and in Africa. And we are now back in the heart of Europe.”

“What do you mean ‘back’? Are you saying that the French had disappeared?”

“We were there; but we were not a factor.”

“Because of Douste-Blazy?”

“No, no, it was Chirac. Chirac!” And now Kouchner told me that when he and Sarkozy met with Bush, Bush said, “Chirac promised me that in the end he would be with us on Iraq. And then he betrayed us.” That was over; now there was trust. When Kouchner told Rice that Europe needed six more months to try to persuade Serbia to accept sovereignty for Kosovo, she agreed. And when he and his contact-group allies sought yet another delay, they got one. And so France was back, a force in the world.

Then Kouchner dropped me off, and the car drove him to his splendid apartment overlooking the Luxembourg Gardens.

See Also:

The Bear Blows First
Kenya Still Burning Despite Political Agreement
Anti-Iran Coalition in the Gulf? Read This.
Who is at Fault in Lebanon? The Blame Game Heats Up

Email

Obama and the Jewish question

The Article: Obama and the Jewish question in yesterday’s edition of Haaretz, an Israeli daily newspaper. Obama and the Jewish question may substitute for Obama and the Israel/Palestine solution, as the self-removal of the pro-Israel right and other ‘softer’ forms of Zionist lobbying from the campaign of who may well be America’s next President could mean a real partner at the peace negotiation table in the future. But one can only hope…

The Text: Not a year has passed since Danny Ayalon completed his term as Israel’s ambassador in Washington, but he has already seen fit to criticize Barack Obama, who may well be the next U.S. president or vice president. In an article published in The Jerusalem Post, Ayalon wrote that during his two meetings with Obama, he got the impression that the Democratic candidate was “not entirely forthright” regarding Israel. Similar and even worse smears can be found in abundance in American blogs and e-mail chain letters.

While Obama was taking advantage of Martin Luther King Day to speak out against anti-Semitism among blacks, Jewish spokesmen were using racist language against him, solely because his father was Muslim. Since it is hard to find so much as a single anti-Jewish statement in Obama’s political record, or even support for anti-Israel policies, his defamers base their arguments on the fact that his positions on the Middle East conflict are “leftist” – solely because he rejects the right’s positions, which are more acceptable to some Jewish-American leaders.

Obama, Hillary Clinton and Republican candidate John McCain have very similar views on the Middle East, and their Senate votes confirm this. Obama has been smeared by the right because of his ties with international relations experts Zbigniew Brzezinksi and Robert Malley, as well as his support for a two-state solution and a withdrawal from most of the settlements. Billionaire George Soros, who has contributed to both the Obama and Clinton campaigns, is also seen by the Jewish right as hostile to Israel, because he is too leftist.

The U.S. elections are important to Israel because of the two countries’ special relationship and America’s support for Israel, whose value cannot be overstated. There is a major contradiction between this fact and a smear campaign against a candidate with a Muslim name, which risks causing many Americans, and especially blacks, to feel alienated from Israel and Jews. Obama is sensitive to Israel’s security needs, and he proved this through his Senate votes, his visit to northern Israel during the Second Lebanon War, and his unequivocal statements against both Hezbollah, which violated Israel’s sovereignty in the North, and Hamas, which violated Israel’s sovereignty in the South.

Obama does not support the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel, but believes that the need to solve the refugee problem must be recognized. He supports Israel as the state of the Jews, and does not accept the view, which has struck roots in the global left, that Israel should be a state of all its citizens, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. He speaks out openly on these issues, as he does about the threat to Israel posed by Iran’s nuclear program, and he did so even before becoming a presidential candidate.

Racist attacks against a black American candidate could cause Israel and American Jews a great deal of damage – not to mention shame and disgrace. Obama has been forced to defend himself over things such as nonexistent ties with elements hostile to Israel, an appearance at an event at which Edward Said spoke, and praying at one church rather than another.

Great damage has already been caused because Obama announced that an ugly campaign was being waged against him in the Jewish community. That alone ought to be enough at least to make Israel’s leaders say something about Jews who preach against anti-Semitism while employing similar tactics against other minorities.

Email

The Truth About The Jena 6

The Article: The Truth About Jena: Why America’s black-and-white narratives about race don’t reflect reality by Amy Waldman in the Atlantic.

The Text: In the fall of 2006, Mychal Bell was a football hero, and his hometown, Jena, Louisiana, loved him for it. As his high-school team posted its best season in six years, Bell scored 21 touchdowns, rushed for 1,006 yards, and was named player of the week three times by The Jena Times. The paper celebrated his triumphs in articles and photographs, including a dramatic one in which Bell, who’s black, stiff-arms a white defender by clutching his face guard. But within weeks after the season’s end, Bell was transformed into a villain, accused of knocking out a white student, Justin Barker, who was then beaten by a group of black students. The parish’s white district attorney charged Bell and five others with attempted second-degree murder. Six months later—after the DA had reduced the charges against Bell—a white jury convicted him, as an adult, of aggravated second-degree battery, a crime that carried a possible 22-year prison sentence. By then, he, along with his co-defendants, had been transformed yet again: together, they’d been dubbed the Jena Six and had become icons of a 21st-century civil-rights movement.

That movement swelled through an electronic underground of blogs and black radio and Web sites, then burst into the national spotlight. On September 20, 2007, it culminated in a protest march that drew some 20,000 people to Jena, a town of roughly 3,000. The movement’s grievance wasn’t just the severe treatment of the Jena Six, but the light treatment of white youths who’d been in fights or hung nooses on a school tree—the “white tree”—after a black student asked if he could sit under it. Together, the galvanizing facts tapped into a larger ache: the record incarceration of African American males—the shift “from plantations to penitentiaries,” as the Reverend Al Sharpton put it at the protest. All of the frustration at the disproportionate imprisonment of black men seemed to find its way to Jena, as if here, at last, in a small town’s idea of justice, was an explanation. At home and around the world, the media found answers in the black-and-white clarity of Race Hate in America, as the British Broadcasting Corporation called an early documentary.

But soon the simple narrative began to fray. For every fact, a countervailing one emerged. Blacks had sometimes sat under the “white tree.” Justin Barker had not been involved in the noose-hanging or in the interracial fights that had occurred over the weekend before he was attacked. Mychal Bell, described in news reports as an “honor student,” turned out to have racked up, along with good grades, at least four previous juvenile offenses. He was said to be living with a white friend, suggesting that black-white relations in Jena were more complex than people assumed, and so on. Skeptics seized on each such revelation to argue that the case was more about black criminality than white racism—a manufactured racial drama à la Tawana Brawley (with Sharpton once again playing a role) or the Duke rape case.

Neither version was correct—and both were. The reality was complex enough that people could assemble a story line, buffet-style, to suit their outlook. The proliferation of media outlets made this even easier. New “facts” popped up everywhere. The Nationalist Movement, a white-supremacist (“pro-majority”) group, ran interviews on its Web site with the victim and the town mayor, providing ammunition for those seeking to prove the town’s racism. On MySpace, a picture appeared of one of the Jena Six posing with $100 bills coming out of his mouth, providing ammunition for those who said the families were milking the cause for money. Anonymous readers posted the arrest record of Mychal Bell’s mother, and other allegations about the family, in an online forum of The Town Talk, a daily newspaper based in nearby Alexandria. It was Wikinews with no mechanism for achieving consensus on the truth—making it maybe the truest version of all.

Even as events refused to cohere into a sensible whole, activists, reporters, and participants kept trying to package them into a recognizable story line. Bell was used to affirm white racism or black thuggery, as two-dimensional as a Kara Walker silhouette but without the artist’s irony. J. Reed Walters, the white district attorney, devolved into caricature, as did Jena itself. The pieces didn’t add up to real people or a real place, and that argued for checking the math.

Along with football, church, and hunting, the most popular pastimes among young Jena residents include “looping”—driving up and back the length of the town, which sprawls along Highway 84 in central Louisiana. After a day or two in Jena, where I went a month after the marchers and other reporters had left, I took to looping myself, past Maw and Paw’s and the Caboose Café, past Blade-N-Barrel and the town hall, past Papa Ron’s Drive-Thru convenience store and Gracie’s Hair and Tanning Salon, past church after church after church. As I did, I noticed that most of the areas where blacks live are outside the official town limits. As it turned out, all of the Jena Six lived outside of Jena.

I found Melissa Bell, the 38-year-old mother of Mychal Bell, in one such black neighborhood, “The Quarters,” in the trailer she and her children have called home for the past four years. On an unseasonably cold day, she lay huddled beneath a blanket on her couch, with a space heater plugged in, the oven on and open, and four gas burners flaming blue into the darkness.

Until her son’s arrest, Melissa Bell’s life had been both prosaic and emblematic. Her father was imprisoned when she was 16. She graduated from Jena High and at 20, after half a year of college, gave birth to Mychal. She had a daughter and another son and by 23 was largely on her own with three children, working nights and relying on her mother’s help. She and Mychal’s father, Marcus Jones, were never a couple, Jones told me; and when Mychal was little, she took Jones to court for child support. In 2000, when Mychal was 10, Jones decamped for Dallas, returning only for intermittent visits until 2007, when he came to free the son he’d left behind. “He has not been there,” said Anthony Jackson, a teacher at Jena High who is related to Marcus Jones. “The mother has had the responsibility of raising Mychal.”

Melissa Bell worked a series of low-wage jobs—at a hospital, Burger Barn, Procter and Gamble—and had her own run-ins with the law, including a stream of bounced checks, for amounts as small as $4, in 2005. To her son, she was more friend than limit-setter, according to Mychal’s best friend, John McPherson. And she was often at work. At 16, Bell was coming into manhood on his own. By the first semester of his junior year, he was spending most of his time with McPherson and his wife in their nearby trailer. McPherson, an oil-field worker, is white—a fact that defenders of the town have made much of—but for him, race was irrelevant. He bonded with Mychal over football and became a mentor to him. “I just knew he needed somebody to give him a break,” says McPherson, who is now 20.

Given the poverty of Bell’s background, the odds were against him: black men in Louisiana are five times as likely to go to prison as to college; in LaSalle Parish, they are incarcerated at twice their proportion in the population. But Bell’s athletic gift gave him a shot at a college scholarship. He combined a knack for the game with the work ethic to make it look easy. After the team watched a game film together, Mychal would borrow it to study more. When opponents lined up, he knew exactly what they were going to run, Mack Fowler, his former coach, says: “He was like a coach on the field”—a leader. As a junior, Bell was already one of the 10 best players Fowler had seen in a 34-year career.

The erratic, and occasionally embarrassing, performance of Jena High’s football team has never diminished the town’s devotion. Schools love to play Jena because of its “gates”—so many townspeople turn out. The Wal-Mart Supercenter sells Jena Giants clothing, and local businesses sponsor the player of the week and plaster the playing field with ads, making the games profitable for the school, too. Bell was a draw, which helps explain why, when he began to get in trouble—to be trouble—so many adults looked the other way. Or as his father put it, “He couldn’t have been too bad—I mean, y’all didn’t prosecute him all this time here.”

In the year leading up to the attack on Barker, Bell had punched a girl, physically assaulted a man, and committed two acts of vandalism—four offenses he was found guilty of in juvenile court. (His father called it “kid stuff” and complained about “Uncle Toms” running to whites at the courthouse.) Fowler, a jowly white man of 56 who says he was “like a granddaddy” to his players, told me of other incidents that he had heard about involving the crowd Bell ran with, which included some of the Jena Six. In the summer of 2006, for example, that crowd had attacked a black ex-convict who had himself once been feared in the neighborhood.

As a child, Bell was “scared of everything,” his mother says—fire engines, police sirens. But as he grew up, his temper began to scare others. “He was hotheaded a lot—that was his only flaw, I believe,” McPherson says, along with “hanging out with the wrong people.” Bell also had a father who believed that no slight should go unanswered—that if you were in the right, as Jones put it, “you have the right to be a man.”

Bell’s volatility became evident in dramatic fashion when he assaulted a female student, LaTara Hart, on Christmas Day, 2005. She got in the middle of Bell’s long-running dispute with her cousin, and ended up at the hospital with injuries—to her eye, jaw, and chest—that her family describes as more serious than Justin Barker’s.

Like John McPherson, LaTara Hart has become ammunition in the information wars, used, in her case, by those seeking to prove that Bell was violent. She has no interest in playing that role, she said when I found her at her family’s comfortable brick house on a weekend back from college. (While Hart had been anonymously, and inaccurately, described in Web accounts, this was the first time she had spoken on the record.) In a community so small that, as Marcus Jones puts it, “if you burp you can hear it all over town” (perhaps on the police scanners that many residents have in their homes), the families are connected: Jones was best man at LaTara’s parents’ wedding. Partly for that reason, the Harts did not press for anything more serious than probation and an apology. LaTara and her mother forgave Bell, although her father has not. (His initial reaction to Bell’s arrest in the Barker case was “They ought to lock him up forever.”) Anlynne Hart, like her daughter, joined the protests against the charging of the Jena Six, but she also believes the whole drama need never have come to pass. “The boy had a history of getting in trouble,” she says, and it should have been reckoned with. At the time he punched LaTara, he seemed to be going through something, “just butting heads” with everyone. The coaches and school officials had to know, she says, because other players told them: “They wanted the child to bring them their touchdowns—and that’s not fair.”

Bell’s legal troubles never cost him a game. Nor did the problems he began to have in school during the fall of 2006, when his grade-point average, which had been above 3.0, slipped substantially. According to Fowler, Bell and another member of the Jena Six were written up so often that school officials asked the school board whether there was a policy on excessive infractions. There wasn’t. The coach said that if necessary, Bell should be sent to an alternative school. He wasn’t. The assistant principal was “sports-minded, you know, so he didn’t want to disrupt,” Fowler says. “And we finished 7 and 3 and barely missed the playoffs. But you look back and wonder—well. But [Bell] was never nothing but ‘Yes sir, no sir’ around us.” Still, Fowler knew enough to warn Bell that if he didn’t watch out, the streets would “whup” him and he would end up with nothing.

That Bell failed to heed that warning is perhaps understandable. As a football star, he seemed to have found the loophole in his father’s lesson that a black man can’t get a break. No wonder he didn’t see that punching a white boy at school could change the rules. “This is Jena,” Anlynne Hart says. “You had the judge and DA at those ball games Friday night, clapping them on—you see what I’m saying? And all this is going through the courts while they’re clapping him on, running up and down the football field, and then the minute this happened to the white boy—it’s like, uh-oh—click-click—he going to jail.”

The district attorney, J. Reed Walters, does not know whether he ever saw Bell play, since he and his wife (who works for the school system) took a break from games after their sons graduated from Jena High. Nearly four decades earlier, Walters had played high-school football himself, in the nearby town of Olla, but he was no Mychal Bell. His aspirations lay elsewhere, in becoming a lawyer. He loves being a small-town prosecutor, and having never craved the spotlight, he feels only “puzzlement” at the global storm he generated. But thanks to the legal discretion that Louisiana grants its district attorneys, it is Walters’s character, not any “Jim Crow” statute, that has shaped the course of Bell’s case. That character, in turn, reflects in no small measure the character of his community.

Raised in Olla by a schoolteacher mother and a father who worked in the timber industry, Walters has spent most of his life in LaSalle Parish. As he entered adolescence, the parish, like many places across the South, was fighting a rear-guard action against school desegregation, a battle chronicled with unabashed bias in its newspaper. The first blacks didn’t enter Jena High until 1969, 15 years after Brown v. Board of Education. The following year, the first black faces appeared in the football team photo; from what I could see, those players also integrated the pages of The Jena Times, which was owned and edited then, as now, by Sammy Franklin. A 1971 photo of Olla’s high-school football team included Walters, then in 10th grade, and one black player. In that same issue, a columnist argued that just because “a Black man cannot work as well as can a White with ideas, symbols, numbers and the like,” he was not inferior—just different.

Over the next decades, Jena settled into its post-segregation identity. Blacks could walk in the front door of the Burger Barn, instead of going to a side window. Relations were cordial, barring a few incidents of white-on-black violence recounted with the horror of legend and occasional school fights stemming from interracial dating. Gas-and-oil exploration joined timber as a stalwart of the economy. Walters settled in Jena in 1981, after law school at Louisiana State University, and has never left. He raised his sons in a large house with a swimming pool on “Snob Hill,” as Jena’s wealthier section is called. He handled the routine cases of a small-town lawyer, and was also drafted into defending the poor. In fact, Walters’s sense that he was winning too many cases for his indigent clients helped inspire his run for district attorney. “Walters Elected D.A., LaSalle Goes for Duke,” reported The Jena Times on October 10, 1990. Sixty-eight percent of voters in LaSalle Parish had turned out, and 63 percent of them had voted for David Duke, the ex-Klansman, for U.S. senator, giving him one of his highest margins in the state. Walters won 51.6 percent of the vote—3,212 votes. By the time Mychal Bell turned 16, Walters had been reelected twice. By statute, he also advises the police jury (akin to a parish council), the school board, and the hospital. The lifelong son of the parish has become a town father.

A number of those town fathers—the police chief; Sammy Franklin of The Jena Times; Walters himself—attend the same church, Midway Baptist, which sits on Highway 84. Midway is among Jena’s larger and more prosperous churches, and Walters is among its pillars. A licensed minister who pinch-hits for the preacher, he also sings (off-key, by his own admission) in the choir, heads its pastor-search committee, and teaches Bible study twice a week. Along with the small-town culture in which he was raised, Walters’s Southern Baptist creed—his certainty of the path to eternal salvation—helps to explain him: in matters of faith, or law, he has the confidence of his convictions.

On the October Sunday morning when I visited, he began Bible study by taking attendance (six adults, including his wife) then turned to the Sermon on the Mount, explaining why Jesus had come to reconcile man to the law of God. Human beings who kept trying to bend the law to their convenience and desires needed an “attitude adjustment,” he said, offering a modern example of bending the law: even though the speed limit is 55, we interpret it as 64 because that’s what will trigger a ticket.

Walters believes time is “critically short” before the Second Coming, when everyone will have to stand before Jesus, and all must perfect themselves for that moment. He strives for that perfection—taking Jesus’ injunction against tearing asunder “what God has joined” so literally, for example, that he frets about the prospect of ever having to pronounce divorces. He actually tries to drive 55. When I asked if he had ever made a mistake, he thought for a moment, then cited a 25-year-old case in which he had misread a report and failed to file a lawsuit in time.

Walters remained convinced that everything he did in the case of the Jena Six was “absolutely 100 percent correct—without question.” Never mind that even some of Walters’s white friends say he charged too severely, not least because the victim was able to attend a school function that night. Walters believed his decision to charge Bell as an adult with attempted murder reflects both the facts of the case, including Bell’s history, and the values that his community holds dear—“conservative,” “help-oriented,” and “Christian.” (I spotted a photocopy of the Ten Commandments hanging on the courthouse bulletin board, next to the bail-bondsman and paternity-testing ads.)

Walters says he does not look at race in his prosecutions. But that does not mean the racial boundaries of his community do not influence him. Whites outnumber blacks by 7-to-1 in the parish; beyond one black member apiece on the 10-member school board and on the 10-member police jury—both from a racially gerrymandered ward—no black has a position of power. There are four black teachers on a parish staff of 196. Black-owned businesses? Sammy Franklin could think of two: a car-detailer and a funeral home.

As for Walters himself, his world—like that of many white Americans—is white, as is most of his neighborhood. The restaurants he frequents rarely have black employees or black patrons. The worshippers at his church are white, as are the small-town-elite circles in which he moves. In 17 years, he says, he has never had a black employee, beyond some who helped him “privately.” He offered as evidence of Jena’s “perfect” race relations that the high school’s white quarterback throws to both black and white players. The white kids who hung the nooses were of Walters’s world—indeed, one of their families attends his church. Mychal Bell was, in essence, a stranger.

That reality was not lost on Jena’s black residents, including Mychal Bell’s mother. She told me a story about going to pick up Mychal’s grades in 2006, before he “got locked up.” Mychal had been failing math, and the teacher was regularly sending him to the principal’s office for clowning around and sleeping. As Bell stood in line, she says, she watched the teacher, who was white, embrace and smile at Jena’s better-off whites, even as she greeted black and lower-class white parents much less warmly. Bell confronted her: “I said, ‘You ain’t got no business being around black kids, because you don’t even want to teach them. You just showed your cards right here: everyone you knew—everyone you knew who got money—they was all good with you.’”

The teacher, Kim Franklin, happens to be married to Craig Franklin, the assistant editor and heir apparent of The Jena Times, which has presented uncritically Walters’s account of the events. (In an op-ed for The Christian Science Monitor, Craig Franklin dismissed the entire affair as journalistic malfeasance, calling Jena a place “where friends are friends regardless of race.”) Kim Franklin says she has always treated all of her students the same, and she and Melissa Bell clearly don’t like each other. But their polarized perceptions, as much as the legal encounter between Walters and Bell, seemed to capture the competing truths of the Jena saga: Bell’s denial of her son’s responsibility, and the town’s denial of its racial cliquishness. The white residents’ loving solicitousness toward their own was subtler than crude racism—which Jena also had—but no less powerful. It reflected a conception of “separate but equal” communities that ultimately weren’t equal at all. Witness the town’s selectively fluid geography: even as black areas have remained unincorporated—unable to vote for mayor or police chief, ineligible for town services like garbage collection—in 2005 Jena annexed a new subdivision to the north of “Snob Hill.”

On September 20, for a span of hours, Jena’s demography inverted: suddenly, the protesters against the status quo outnumbered its defenders by at least 6-to-1. But although the protesters passed right over the town lines, they didn’t take up the cause of moving them. For all its noise, the Jena Six movement lacked a clear sense of where to apply its force. It probably helped reduce the charges against the boys, although Walters denies that public pressure swayed him. Vigorous defense lawyering got Bell’s conviction as an adult overturned earlier that month. And it’s unlikely that, at least in Jena, public officials will treat noose-hanging lightly in the future. But so much else was left untouched. The protesters didn’t press to improve the parish’s indigent-defense system, poor even by the standards of Louisiana; didn’t ask why two schools in the southern part of the parish are still effectively segregated, providing an escape valve for white Jena parents who wish to avoid sending their children to integrated schools; and didn’t talk about the habitual-offender law Walters used to send a peer of Bell’s father to the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola for life for three nonviolent offenses. “We will not stop marching until justice runs down like waters,” Jesse Jackson said. But the Jena Six movement seemed like a mighty flood that left bent and broken twigs in its wake—and the contours of the riverbanks unchanged.

Less surprising is that the movement avoided the other side of Mychal Bell’s story: his own choices, for starters, or the link between the generational disintegration of black families and black incarceration. The lip service about not excusing Bell’s past or the boys’ attack on Barker didn’t diminish the hagiography, which climaxed in a standing ovation for two of the Jena Six when they appeared as presenters at the Black Entertainment Television awards (dressed in hip-hop gear, which coach Fowler says they never wore in Jena).

Anlynne Hart, the mother of Bell’s earlier victim, says his parents should have acknowledged his history up front and declared that he deserved help in spite of it. But would such a movement have grown around an icon with a tragic flaw? There is a reason we tell these stories as we do. On Melissa Bell’s wall hung a commendatory plaque from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the organization Martin Luther King Jr. co-founded and led. Simply by mothering Mychal and standing by him, she became a heroine of this civil-rights movement, an elevation that perhaps spoke more to its character than to hers.

On the gray day when I met Melissa Bell, her mood was as dismal as the weather. Her son’s future seemed unpredictable. His conviction in the Justin Barker case had been overturned on the grounds that he shouldn’t have been tried as an adult, but he faced retrial as a juvenile. He had come home in September after more than nine months in prison—then been returned to custody two weeks later because of his previous juvenile offenses. He had missed Christmas and his birthday and at least one U.S. Army National Combine game, a national forum where high-school players show their stuff. He was, even at that moment, missing his senior season of football, and all the promise that had portended.

One weekend last year, Marcus Jones drove north from Jena to visit his son in prison. He was excited: a recruitment letter for Bell had come from LSU, whose football team is revered here.

“Now this is the college,” he told Mychal, handing him the letter. He realized his mistake only with his son’s rueful reaction: “Oh Lord, that was a dream right there.”

Instead of a bright future, as Jones had initially thought, the letter evidenced only how much Bell had thrown away—or had had taken from him, depending on whose version you believed. From then on, Jones said, when Bell asked whether other letters had come, his mother lied and said no.

But in December, Bell’s forecast changed. Days before his trial was scheduled to start, he and Walters made a deal: Bell pleaded guilty to second-degree battery, a misdemeanor; acknowledged in open court that he had punched Barker; and agreed to testify against his co-defendants should they go to trial. He was sentenced to 18 months, including time served, which means he should be out by summer. Even as both sides claimed victory of a sort, it was hard to escape the sense that they had fought to an exhausted draw.

Under the terms of the deal, Bell will be admitted into a high school yet to be determined, which means he could be playing football again by fall. He now has a second chance at that LSU scholarship—to the extent, that is, that he ever had a chance at all.

As it turns out, Fowler, Bell’s former coach, didn’t think Bell would make it to LSU, as he told me when we met in October. The rain was beating through the pine thicket around his home, and dark had fallen early. His cat, Fancy, nestled on his belly. Fowler, who spent his life in sports and education, had retired prematurely at the end of the school year, his spirit broken in part by the jailing of Bell and two other players who were part of the Jena Six. He struck me as wanting to unburden himself—even if doing so exposed his own clay feet.

As talented and versatile as Bell was, Fowler said, at 5 feet 9 inches or so, and maybe 190 pounds, he probably wasn’t big enough for LSU, and likely could have played only for a Division II or a small Division I school. Those prized recruitment letters? Fowler, like every other coach, put his best players’ names out; the schools then blanketed prospects with pro forma letters of interest. “I’m gonna tell you, these colleges, they send 1,000 a day,” Fowler said. Until the college recruiters look at game film, they can’t say whether they’re truly interested or not.

Bell and the other players didn’t know that, and Fowler and the other coaches didn’t tell them. During the off- season, the letters helped propel the kids through the tedium of running and lifting weights—keeping them working, so their high-school teams could keep on winning.

Email

Was Democracy Just A Moment?

The Article: Was Democracy Just A Moment?, part of Robert Kaplan’s collection of essay’s from The Coming Anarchy.

The Text: In the fourth century A.D. Christianity’s conquest of Europe and the Mediterranean world gave rise to the belief that a peaceful era in world politics was at hand, now that a consensus had formed around an ideology that stressed the sanctity of the individual. But Christianity was, of course, not static. It kept evolving, into rites, sects, and “heresies” that were in turn influenced by the geography and cultures of the places where it took root. Meanwhile, the church founded by Saint Peter became a ritualistic and hierarchical organization guilty of long periods of violence and bigotry. This is to say nothing of the evils perpetrated by the Orthodox churches in the East. Christianity made the world not more peaceful or, in practice, more moral but only more complex. Democracy, which is now overtaking the world as Christianity once did, may do the same.

The collapse of communism from internal stresses says nothing about the long-term viability of Western democracy. Marxism’s natural death in Eastern Europe is no guarantee that subtler tyrannies do not await us, here and abroad. History has demonstrated that there is no final triumph of reason, whether it goes by the name of Christianity, the Enlightenment, or, now, democracy. To think that democracy as we know it will triumph-or is even here to stay-is itself a form of determinism, driven by our own ethnocentricity. In deed, those who quote Alexis de Tocqueville in support of democracy’s inevitability should pay heed to his observation that Americans, because of their (comparative) equality, exaggerate “the scope of human perfectibility.” Despotism, Tocqueville went on, “is more particularly to be feared in democratic ages,” because it thrives on the obsession with self and one’s own security which equality fosters.

I submit that the democracy we are encouraging in many poor parts of the world is an integral part of a transformation toward new forms of authoritarianism; that democracy in the United States is at greater risk than ever before, and from obscure sources; and that many future regimes, ours especially, could resemble the oligarchies of ancient Athens and Sparta more than they do the current government in Washington. History teaches that it is exactly at such prosperous times as these that we need to maintain a sense of the tragic, however unnecessary it may seem. The Greek historian Polybius, of the second century B.C., interpreted what we consider the Golden Age of Athens as the beginning of its decline. To Thucydides, the very security and satisfactory life that the Athenians enjoyed under Pericles blinded them to the bleak forces of human nature that were gradually to be their undoing in the Peloponnesian War.

My pessimism is, I hope, a foundation for prudence. America’s Founders were often dismal about the human condition. James Madison: “Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.” Thomas Paine: “Society is produced by our wants and government by our wickedness.” It was the “crude” and “reactionary” philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, which placed security ahead of liberty in a system of enlightened despotism, from which the Founders drew philosophical sustenance. Paul A. Rahe, a professor of history at the University of Tulsa, shows in his superb three-volume Republics Ancient and Modern (1992) how the Founders partly rejected the ancient republics, which were based on virtue, for a utilitarian regime that channeled man’s selfish, materialistic instincts toward benign ends. Man, Benjamin Franklin said in an apparent defense of Hobbesian determinism, is “a tool-making animal.”

Democracies Are Value-Neutral

Hitler and Mussolini each came to power through democracy. Democracies do not always make societies more civil-but they do always mercilessly expose the health of the societies in which they operate.

In April of 1985 I found myself in the middle of a Sudanese crowd that had just helped to overthrow a military regime and replace it with a new government, which the following year held free and fair elections. Sudan’s newly elected democracy led immediately to anarchy, which in turn led to the most brutal tyranny in Sudan’s postcolonial history: a military regime that broadened the scope of executions, persecuted women, starved non-Muslims to death, sold kidnapped non-Muslim children back to their parents for $200, and made Khartoum the terrorism capital of the Arab world, replacing Beirut. In Sudan only 27 percent of the population (and only 12 percent of the women) could read. If a society is not in reasonable health, democracy can be not only risky but disastrous: during the last phases of the post-First World War German and Italian democracies, for example, the unemployment and inflation figures for Germany and the amount of civil unrest in Italy were just as abysmal as Sudan’s literacy rates.

As an unemployed Tunisian student once told me, “In Tunisia we have a twenty-five percent unemployment rate. If you hold elections in such circumstances, the result will be a fundamentalist government and violence like in Algeria. First create an economy, then worry about elections.” There are many differences between Tunisia and its neighbor Algeria, including the fact that Tunisia has been peaceful without democracy and Algeria erupted in violence in 1992 after its first election went awry and the military canceled the second. In Kurdistan and Afghanistan, two fragile tribal societies in which the United States encouraged versions of democracy in the 1 990s, the security vacuums that followed the failed attempts at institutionalizing pluralism were filled by Saddam Hussein for a time in Kurdistan and by Islamic tyranny in much of Afghanistan. In Bosnia democracy legitimized the worst war crimes in Europe since the Nazi era. In sub-Saharan Africa democracy has weakened institutions and services in some states, and elections have been manipulated to restore dictatorship in others. In Sierra Leone and Congo-Brazzaville elections have led to chaos. In Mali, which Africa-watchers have christened a democratic success story, recent elections were boycotted by the opposition and were marred by killings and riots. Voter turnout was less than 20 percent. Even in Latin America, the Third World’s most successful venue for democracy, the record is murky. Venezuela has enjoyed elected civilian governments since 1959, whereas for most of the 1970s and 1980s Chile was effectively under military rule. But Venezuela is a society in turmoil, with periodic coup attempts, rampant crime, and an elite that invests most of its savings outside the country; as a credit risk Venezuela ranks behind only Russia and Mexico. Chile has become a stable middle class society whose economic growth rate compares to those of the Pacific Rim. Democratic Colombia is a pageant of bloodletting, and many members of the middle class are attempting to leave the country. Then there is Peru, where, all the faults of the present regime notwithstanding, a measure of stability has been achieved by a retreat from democracy into quasi-authoritarianism.

Throughout Latin America there is anxiety that unless the middle classes are enlarged and institutions modernized, the wave of democratization will not be consolidated. Even in an authentically democratic nation like Argentina, institutions are weak and both corruption and unemployment are high. President Carlos Menem’s second term has raised questions about democracy’s sustainability-questions that the success of his first term seemed to have laid to rest. In Brazil and other countries democracy faces a backlash from millions of badly educated and newly urbanized dwellers in teeming slums, who see few palpable benefits to Western parliamentary systems. Their discontent is a reason for the multifold increases in crime in many Latin American cities over the past decade.

Because both a middle class and civil institutions are required for successful democracy, democratic Russia, which inherited neither from the Soviet regime, remains violent, unstable, and miserably poor despite its 99 percent literacy rate. Under its authoritarian system China has dramatically improved the quality of life for hundreds of millions of its people. My point, hard as it may be for Americans to accept, is that Russia may be failing in part because it is a democracy and China may be succeeding in part be cause it is not. Having traveled through much of western China, where Muslim Turkic Uighurs (who despise the Chinese) often predominate, I find it hard to imagine a truly democratic China without at least a partial breakup of the country. Such a breakup would lead to chaos in western China, because the Uighurs are poorer and less educated than most Chinese and have a terrible historical record of governing themselves. Had the student demonstrations in 1989 in Tiananmen Square led to democracy, would the astoundingly high economic growth rates of the 1990s still obtain’? I am not certain, because democracy in China would have ignited turmoil not just in the Muslim west of the country but elsewhere, too; order would have decreased but corruption would not have. The social and economic breakdowns under democratic rule in Albania and Bulgaria, where the tradition of pre-communist bourgeois life is weak or nonexistent (as in China), contrasted with more-successful democratic venues like Hungary and the Czech Republic, which have had well-established bourgeoisie, constitute further proof that our belief in democracy regardless of local conditions amounts to cultural hubris.

Look at Haiti, a small country only ninety minutes by air from Miami, where 22,000 American soldiers were dispatched in 1994 to restore “democracy.” Five percent of eligible Haitian voters participated in an election last April, chronic instability continues, and famine threatens. Those who think that America can establish democracy the world over should heed the words of the late American theologian and political philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr:

“The same strength which has extended our power beyond a continent has also . . . brought us into a vast web of history in which other wills, running in oblique or contrasting directions to our own, inevitably hinder or contradict what we most fervently desire. We cannot simply have our way, not even when we believe our way to have the “happiness of mankind” as its promise.”

The lesson to draw is not that dictatorship is good and democracy bad but that democracy emerges successfully on]y as a capstone to other .social and economic achievements. In his “Author’s Introduction” to Democracy in America, Tocqueville showed how democracy evolved in the West not through the kind of moral fiat we are trying to impose throughout the world but as an organic outgrowth of development. European society had reached a level of complexity and sophistication at which the aristocracy, so as not to overburden itself, had to confer a measure of equality upon other citizens and allocate some responsibility to them: a structured division of the population into peacefully competing interest groups was necessary if both tyranny and anarchy were to be averted.

The very fact that we retreat to moral arguments-and often moral arguments only-to justify democracy indicates that for many parts of the world the historical and social arguments supporting democracy are just not there. Realism has come not from us but from, for example, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni, an enlightened Hobbesian despot whose country has posted impressive annual economic growth rates-10 percent recently-despite tribal struggles in the country’s north. In 1986 Museveni’s army captured the Ugandan capital of Kampala without looting a single shop; Museveni postponed elections and saw that they took place in a manner that ensured his victory. “I happen to be one of those people who do not believe in multi-party democracy,” Museveni has written. “In fact, I am totally opposed to it as far as Africa today is concerned…. If one forms a multi-party system in Uganda, a party cannot win elections unless it finds a way of dividing the ninety-four percent of the electorate [that consists of peasants], and this is where the main problem comes up: tribalism, religion, or regionalism becomes the basis for intense partisanship.” In other words, in a society that has not reached the level of development Toqueville described, a multi-party system merely hardens and institutionalizes established ethnic and regional divisions. Look at Armenia and Azerbaijan, where democratic processes brought nationalists to power upon the demise of the Soviet Union: each leader furthered his country’s slide into war. A coup in Azerbaijan was necessary to restore peace and, by developing Azerbaijan’s enormous oil resources, foster economic growth. Without the coup Western oil companies would not have gained their current foothold, which has allowed the United States to increase pressure on neighboring Iran at the same time that we at tempt to normalize relations with Iran “on our terms.”

Certainly, moral arguments in support of democracy were aired at the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, but they were tempered by the kind of historical and social analysis we now abjure. “The Constitution of the United States was written by fifty-five men-and one ghost,” writes retired Army Lieutenant General Dave R. Palmer in 1794: America, Its Army, and the Birth of the Natian (1994). The ghost was that of Oliver Cromwell, the archetypal man on horseback who, in the course of defending Parliament against the monarchy in the mid seventeenth century, devised a tyranny worse than any that had ever existed under the English Kings. The Founders were terrified of a badly educated populace that could be duped by a Cromwell, and of a system that could allow too much power to fall into one person’s hands. That is why they constructed a system that filtered the whims of the masses through an elected body and dispersed power by dividing the government into three branches.

The ghosts of today we ignore-like the lesson offered by Rwanda, where the parliamentary system the West promoted was a factor in the murder of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis by Hutu militias. In 1992, responding partly to pressure from Western governments, the Rwandan regime established a multi-party system and transformed itself into a coalition government. The new political parties be came masks for ethnic groups that organized murderous militias, and the coalition nature of the new government helped to prepare the context for the events that led to the genocide in 1994. Evil individuals were certainly responsible for the mass murder. But they operated within a fatally flawed system, which our own ethnocentric hubris helped to construct. Indeed, our often moralistic attempts to impose Western parliamentary systems on other countries are not dissimilar to the attempts of nineteenth-century Western colonialists-many of whom were equally idealistic-to replace well-functioning chieftancy and tribal patronage systems with foreign administrative practices.

The demise of the Soviet Union was no reason for us to pressure Rwanda and other countries to form political parties-though that is what our post-Cold War foreign policy has been largely about, even in parts of the world that the Cold War barely touched. The Eastern European countries liberated in 1989 already had, in varying degrees, the historical and social preconditions for both democracy and advanced industrial life: bourgeois traditions, exposure to the Western Enlightenment, high literacy rates, low birth rates, and so on. The post-Cold War effort to bring democracy to those countries has been reasonable. What is less reasonable is to put a gun to the head of the peoples of the developing world and say, in effect, “Behave as if you had experienced the Western Enlightenment to the degree that Poland and the Czech Republic did. Behave as if 95 percent of your population were literate. Behave as if you had no bloody ethnic or regional disputes.”

States have never been formed by elections. Geography, settlement patterns, the rise of literate bourgeoisie, and, tragically, ethnic cleansing have formed states. Greece, for instance, is a stable democracy partly because earlier in the century it carried out a relatively benign form of ethnic cleansing-in the form of refugee transfers-which created a monoethnic society. Nonetheless, it took several decades of economic development for Greece finally to put its coups behind it. Democracy often weakens states by necessitating ineffectual compromises and fragile coalition governments in societies where bureaucratic institutions never functioned well to begin with. Because democracy neither forms states nor strengthens them initially, multi-party systems are best suited to nations that already have efficient bureaucracies and a middle class that pays income tax, and where primary issues such as borders and power sharing have already been resolved, leaving politicians free to bicker about the budget and other secondary matters.

Social stability results from the establishment of a middle class. Not democracies but authoritarian systems, including monarchies, create middle classes-which, having achieved a certain size and self-confidence, revolt against the very dictators who generated their prosperity. This is the pattern today in the Pacific Rim and the southern cone of South America, but not in other parts of Latin America, southern Asia, or sub-Saharan Africa. A place like the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), where the per capita gross national product is less than $200 a year and the average person is either a rural peasant or an urban peasant; where there is little infrastructure of roads, sewers, and so on; and where reliable bureaucratic institutions are lacking, needs a leader like Bismarck or Jerry Rawlings-the Ghanaian ruler who stabilized his country through dictatorship and then had himself elected democratically-in place for years before he is safe from an undisciplined soldiery.

Foreign correspondents in sub-Saharan Africa who equate democracy with progress miss this point, ignoring both history and centuries of political philosophy. They seem to think that the choice is between dictators and democrats. But for many places the only choice is between bad dictators and slightly better ones. To force elections on such places may give us some instant gratification. But after a few months or years a bunch of soldiers with grenades will get bored and greedy, and will easily topple their fledgling democracy. As likely as not, the democratic government will be composed of corrupt, bickering, ineffectual politicians whose weak rule never had an institutional base to start with: modern bureaucracies generally require high literacy rates over several generations. Even India, the great exception that proves the rule, has had a mixed record of success as a democracy, with Bihar and other poverty wracked places remaining in semi-anarchy. Ross Munro, a noted Asia expert, has documented how Chinese autocracy has better prepared China’s population for the economic rigors of the post-industrial age than Indian democracy has prepared India’s.

Of course, our post-Cold War mission to spread democracy is partly a pose. In Egypt and Saudi Arabia, America’s most important allies in the energy-rich Muslim world, our worst nightmare would be free and fair elections, as it would be elsewhere in the Middle East. The end of the Cold War has changed our attitude toward those authoritarian regimes that are not crucial to our interests-but not toward those that are. We praise democracy, and meanwhile we are grateful for an autocrat like King Hussein, and for the fact that the Turkish and Pakistani militaries have always been the real powers behind the “democracies” in their countries. Obviously, democracy in the abstract encompasses undeniably good things such as civil society and a respect for human rights. But as a matter of public policy it has unfortunately come to focus on elections. What is in fact happening in many places requires a circuitous explanation.

The New Authoritarianism

The battle between liberal and neoconservative moralists who are concerned with human rights and tragic realists who are concerned with security, balance-of-power politics, and economic matters (famously, Henry Kissinger) is a variation of a classic dispute between two great English philosophers-the twentieth-century liberal humanist Isaiah Berlin and the seventeenth-century monarchist and translator of Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes.

In May of 1953, while the ashes of the Nazi Holocaust were still smoldering and Stalin’s grave was fresh, Isaiah Berlin delivered a spirited lecture against “historical inevitability”-the whole range of belief, advocated by Hobbes and others, according to which individuals and their societies are determined by their past, their civilization, and even their biology and environment. Berlin argued that adherence to historical inevitability, so disdainful of the very characteristics that make us human, led to Nazism and communism-both of them extreme attempts to force a direction onto history. Hobbes is just one of many famous philosophers Berlin castigated in his lecture, but it is Hobbes’s bleak and elemental philosophy that most conveniently sums up what Berlin and other moralists so revile. Hobbes suggested that even if human beings are nobler than apes, they are nevertheless governed by biology and environment. According to Hobbes, our ability to reason is both a mask for and a slave to our passions, our religions arise purely from fear, and theories about our divinity must be subordinate to the reality of how we behave. Enlightened despotism is thus preferable to democracy: the masses require protection from themselves. Hobbes, who lived through the debacle of parliamentary rule under Cromwell, published his translation of Thucydides in order, he said, to demonstrate how democracy, among other factors, was responsible for Athens’s decline. Reflecting on ancient Athens, the philosopher James Harrington, a contemporary and follower of Hobbes, remarked that he could think of “nothing more dangerous” than “debate in a crowd.”

Though the swing toward democracy following the Cold War was a triumph for liberal philosophy, the pendulum will come to rest where it belongs-in the middle, between the ideals of Berlin and the realities of Hobbes. Where a political system leans too far in either direction, realignment or disaster awaits.

In 1993 Pakistan briefly enjoyed the most successful period of governance in its history. The government was neither democratic nor authoritarian but a cross between the two. The unelected Prime Minister, Moin Qureshi, was chosen by the President, who in turn was backed by the military. Because Qureshi had no voters to please, he made bold moves that restored political stability and economic growth. Before Qureshi there had been violence and instability under the elected governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Bhutto’s government was essentially an ethnic-Sindhi mafia based in the south; Sharif’s was an ethnic-Punjabi mafia from the geographic center. When Qureshi handed the country back to “the people,” elections returned Bhutto to power, and chaos resumed. Finally, in November of last year, Pakistan’s military-backed President again deposed Bhutto. The sigh of relief throughout the country was audible. Recent elections brought Sharif, the Punjabi, back to power. He is governing better than the first time, but communal violence has returned to Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi. I believe that Pakistan must find its way back to a hybrid regime like the one that worked so well in 1993; the other options are democratic anarchy and military tyranny. (Anarchy and tyranny, of course, are closely related: because power abhors a vacuum, the one necessarily leads to the other. One day in 1996 Kabul, the Afghan capital, was ruled essentially by no one; the next day it was ruled by Taliban, an austere religious movement.)

Turkey’s situation is similar to Pakistan’s. During the Cold War, Turkey’s military intervened when democracy threatened mass violence, about once every decade. But Turkish coups are no longer tolerated by the West, so Turkey’s military has had to work behind the scenes to keep civilian governments from acting too irrationally for our comfort and that of many secular Turks. As elected governments in Turkey become increasingly circumscribed by the army, a quieter military paternalism is likely to evolve in place of periodic coups. The crucial element is not the name the system goes by but how the system actually works.

Peru offers another version of subtle authoritarianism. In 1990 Peruvian voters elected Alberto Fujimori to dismantle parts of their democracy. He did, and as a consequence he restored a measure of civil society to Peru. Fujimori disbanded Congress and took power increasingly into his own hands, using it to weaken the Shining Path guerrilla movement, reduce inflation from 7,500 percent to 10 percent, and bring investment and jobs back to Peru. In 1995 Fujimori won re-election with three times as many votes as his nearest challenger. Fujimori’s use of deception and corporate-style cost-benefit analyses allowed him to finesse brilliantly the crisis caused by the terrorist seizure of the Japanese embassy in Lima. The commando raid that killed the terrorists probably never could have taken place amid the chaotic conditions of the preceding Peruvian government. Despite the many problems Fujimori has had and still has, it is hard to argue that Peru has not benefited from his rule.

In many of these countries Hobbesian realities-in particular, too many young, violence-prone males without jobs-have necessitated radical action. In a York University study published last year the scholars Christian G. Mesquida and Neil I. Wiener demonstrate how countries with young populations (young poor males especially) are subject to political violence. With Third World populations growing dramatically (albeit at slowing rates) and becoming increasingly urbanized, democrats must be increasingly ingenious and dictators increasingly tyrannical in order to rule successfully. Surveillance, too, will become more important on an urbanized planet; it is worth noting that the etymology of the word “police” is polis, Greek for “city.” Because tottering democracies and despotic militaries frighten away the investors required to create jobs for violence-prone youths, more hybrid regimes will perforce emerge. They will call themselves democracies, and we may go along with the lie-but, as in Peru, the regimes will be decisively autocratic. (Hobbes wrote that Thucydides “praiseth the government of Athens, when . . . it was democratic in name, but in effect monarchical under Pericles.” Polybius, too, recommended mixed regimes as the only stable form of government.) Moreover, if a shortage of liquidity affects world capital markets by 2000, as Klaus Schwab, the president of the World Economic Forum, and other experts fear may happen, fiercer competition among developing nations for scarcer investment money will accelerate the need for efficient neo-authoritarian governments.

The current reality in Singapore and South Africa, for instance, shreds our democratic certainties. Lee Kuan Yew’s offensive neo-authoritarianism, in which the state has evolved into a corporation that is paternalistic meritocratic, and decidedly undemocratic, has forged prosperity from abject poverty. A survey of business executives and economists by the World Economic Forum ranked Singapore No. I among the fifty-three most advanced countries appearing on an index of global competitiveness. What is good for business executives is often good for the average citizen: per capita wealth in Singapore is nearly equal to that in Canada, the nation that ranks No. I in the world on the United Nations’ Human Development Index. When Lee took over Singapore, more than thirty years ago, it was a mosquito-ridden bog filled with slum quarters that frequently lacked both plumbing and electricity. Doesn’t liberation from filth and privation count as a human right? Jeffrey Sachs, a professor of international trade at Harvard, writes that “good government” means relative safety from corruption, from breach of contract, from property expropriation, and from bureaucratic inefficiency. Singapore’s reputation in these regards is unsurpassed. If Singapore’s 2.8 million citizens ever demand democracy, they will just prove the assertion that prosperous middle classes arise under authoritarian regimes before gaining the confidence to dislodge their benefactors. Singapore’s success is frightening, yet it must be acknowledged.

Democratic South Africa, meanwhile, has become one of the most violent places on earth that are not war zones, according to the security firm Kroll Associates. The murder rate is six times that in the United States, five times that in Russia. There are ten private-security guards for every policeman. The currency has substantially declined, educated people continue to flee, and international drug cartels have made the country a new transshipment center. Real unemployment is about 33 percent, and is probably much higher among youths. Jobs cannot be created without the cooperation of foreign investors, but assuaging their fear could require the kind of union-busting and police actions that democracy will not permit. The South African military was the power behind the regime in the last decade of apartheid. And it is the military that may yet he]p to rule South Africa in the future. Like Pakistan but more so, South Africa is destined for a hybrid regime if it is to succeed. The abundant coverage of South Africa’s impressive attempts at coming to terms with the crimes of apartheid serves to obscure the country’s growing problems. There is a sense of fear in such celebratory, backward-looking coverage, as if writing too much about difficulties in that racially symbolic country would expose the limits of the liberal humanist enterprise worldwide.

Burma, too, may be destined for a hybrid regime, despite the deification of the opposition leader and Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi by Western journalists. While the United States calls for democracy in and economic sanctions against Burma, those with more immediate clout-that is, Burma’s Asian neighbors, and especially corporate-oligarchic militaries like Thailand’s-show no compunction about increasing trade links with Burma’s junta. Aung San Suu Kyi may one day bear the title of leader of Burma, but only with the tacit approval of a co-governing military. Otherwise Burma will not be stable. A rule of thumb is that governments are determined not by what liberal humanists wish but rather by what business people and others require. Various democratic revolutions failed in Europe in 1848 because what the intellectuals wanted was not what the emerging middle classes wanted. For quite a few parts of today’s world, which have at best only the beginnings of a middle class, the Europe of the mid-nineteenth century provides a closer comparison than the Europe of the late twentieth century. In fact, for the poorest countries where we now recommend democracy, Cromwell’s England may provide the best comparison. As with the Christian religion (whose values are generally different for Americans than for Bosnian Serbs or for Lebanese Phalangists, to take only three examples), the nominal system of a government is less significant than the nature of the society in which it operates. And as democracy sinks into the soils of various local cultures, it often leaves less-than-nourishing deposits. “Democracy” in Cambodia, for instance, began evolving into something else almost immediately after the UN-sponsored elections there, in 1993. Hun Sen, one of two Prime Ministers in a fragile coalition, lived in a fortified bunker from which he physically threatened journalists and awarded government contracts in return for big bribes. His coup last summer, which toppled his co-Prime Minister and ended the democratic experiment, should have come as no surprise.

“World Government”

Authoritarian or hybrid regimes, no matter how illiberal, will still be treated as legitimate if they can provide security for their subjects and spark economic growth. And they will easily find acceptance in a world driven increasingly by financial markets that know no borders.

For years idealists have dreamed of a “world government.” Well, a world government has been emerging-quietly and organically, the way vast developments in history take place. I do not refer to the United Nations, the power of which, almost by definition, affects only the poorest countries. After its peacekeeping failures in Bosnia and Somalia-and its $2 billion failure to make Cambodia democratic-the UN is on its way to becoming a supranational relief agency. Rather, I refer to the increasingly dense ganglia of international corporations and markets that are becoming the unseen arbiters of power in many countries. It is much more important nowadays for the leader of a developing country to get a hearing before corporate investors at the World Economic Forum than to speak before the UN General Assembly. Amnesty International now briefs corporations, just as it has always briefed national governments. Interpol officials have spoken about sharing certain kinds of intelligence with corporations. The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, is recognizing the real new world order (at least in this case) by building a low-tax district he calls a “multimedia super corridor,” with two new cities and a new airport designed specifically for international corporations. The world’s most efficient peacemaking force belongs not to the UN or even to the great powers but to a South African corporate mercenary force called Executive Outcomes, which restored relative stability to Sierra Leone in late 1995. (This is reminiscent of the British East India Company, which raised armies transparently for economic interests.) Not long after Executive Outcomes left Sierra Leone, where only 20.7 percent of adults can read, that country’s so called model democracy crumbled into military anarchy, as Sudan’s model democracy had done in the late 1980s.

Of the world’s hundred largest economies, fifty-one are not countries but corporations. While the 200 largest corporations employ less than three fourths of one percent of the world’s work force, they account for 28 percent of world economic activity. The 500 largest corporations account for 70 percent of world trade. Corporations are like the feudal domains that evolved into nation-states; they are nothing less than the vanguard of a new Darwinian organization of politics. Because they are in the forefront of real globalization while the overwhelming majority of the world’s inhabitants are still rooted in local terrain, corporations will be free for a few decades to leave behind the social and environmental wreckage they create-abruptly closing a factory here in order to open an unsafe facility with a cheaper work force there. Ultimately, as technological innovations continue to accelerate and the world’s middle classes come closer together, corporations may well become more responsible to the cohering global community and less amoral in the course of their evolution toward new political and cultural forms.

For instance, ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. is a $36 billion-a-year multinational corporation divided into 1,300 companies in 140 countries; no one national group accounts for more than 20 percent of its employees. ABB’s chief executive officer, Percy Barnevik, recently told an interviewer that this diversity is so that ABB can develop its own “global ABB culture-you might say an umbrella culture.” Barnevik explains that his best managers are moved around periodically so that they and their families can develop “global personalities” by living and growing up in different countries. ABB management teams, moreover, are never composed of employees from any one country. Barnevik says that this encourages a “cross-cultural glue.” Unlike the multiculturalism of the left, which masks individual deficiencies through collective-that is, ethnic or racial-self-esteem, a multinational corporation like ABB has created a diverse multicultural environment in which individuals rise or fall completely on their own merits. Like the hybrid regimes of the present and future, such an evolving corporate community can bear an eerie resemblance to the oligarchies of the ancient world. “Decentralization goes hand in hand with central monitoring,” Barnevik says. The level of social development required by democracy as it is known in the West has existed in only a minority of places-and even there only during certain periods of history. We are entering a troubling transition, and the irony is that while we preach our version of democracy abroad, it slips away from us at home.

The Shrinking Domain of “Politics”

I put special emphasis on corporations because of the true nature of politics: who does and who doesn’t have power. To categorize accurately the political system of a given society, one must define the significant elements of power within it. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis knew this instinctively, which is why he railed against corporate monopolies. Of course, the influence that corporations wield over government and the economy is so vast and obvious that the point needs no elaboration. But there are other, more covert forms of emerging corporate power.

The number of residential communities with defended perimeters that have been built by corporations went from 1,000 in the early 1960s to more than 80,000 by the mid 1980s, with continued dramatic increases in the 1990s. (“Gated communities” are not an American invention. They are an import from Latin America, where deep social divisions in places like Rio de Janeiro and Mexico City make them necessary for the middle class.) Then there are malls, with their own rules and security forces, as opposed to public streets; private health clubs as opposed to public play grounds; incorporated suburbs with strict zoning; and other mundane aspects of daily existence in which-perhaps without realizing it, because the changes have been so gradual-we opt out of the public sphere and the “social contract” for the sake of a protected setting. Dennis Judd, an urban-affairs expert at the University of Missouri at St. Louis, told me recently, “It’s nonsense to think that Americans are individualists. Deep down we are a nation of herd animals: micelike conformists who will lay at our doorstep many of our rights if someone tells us that we won’t have to worry about crime and our property values are secure. We have always put up with restrictions inside a corporation which we would never put up with in the public sphere. But what many do not realize is that life within some sort of corporation is what the future will increasingly be about.”

Indeed, a number of American cities are re-emerging as Singapores, with corporate enclaves that are dedicated to global business and defended by private security firms adjacent to heavily zoned suburbs. For instance, in my travels I have looked for St. Louis and Atlanta and not found them. I found only hotels and corporate offices with generic architecture, “nostalgic” tourist bubbles, zoned suburbs, and bleak urban wastelands; there was nothing distinctive that I could label “St. Louis” or “Atlanta.” Last year’s Olympics in Atlanta will most likely be judged by future historians as the first of the postmodern era, because of the use of social facades to obscure fragmentation. Peace and racial harmony were continually proclaimed to be Olympic themes-even though whites and blacks in Atlanta live in separate enclaves and the downtown is a fortress of office blocks whose streets empty at dusk. During the games a virtual army was required to protect visitors from terrorism, as at previous Olympics, and also from random crime. All this seems normal. It is both wonderful and frightening how well we adapt.

Universities, too, are being redefined by corporations. I recently visited Omaha, where the corporate community made it possible for the Omaha branch of the University of Nebraska to build an engineering school even after the Board of Regents vetoed the project. Local corporations, particularly First Data Resources, wanted the school, so they worked with the Omaha branch of the university to finance what became less a school than a large information science and engineering complex. “This is the future,” said the chancellor of the Omaha campus, Del Weber. “Universities will have to become entrepreneurs, working with corporations on curriculum [emphasis mine] and other matters, or they will die.” The California state university system, in particular the San Diego campus, is perhaps the best example of corporate-academic synergy, in which a school rises in prestige because its curriculum has practical applications for nearby technology firms.

Corporations, which are anchored neither to nations nor to communities, have created strip malls, edge cities, and Disneyesque tourist bubbles. Developments are not necessarily bad: they provide low prices, convenience, efficient work forces, and, in the case of tourist bubbles, safety. We need big corporations. Our society has reached a level of social and technological complexity at which goods and services must be produced for a price and to a standard that smaller businesses cannot manage. We should also recognize, though, that the architectural reconfiguration of our cities and towns has been an undemocratic event- with decisions in effect handed down from above by an assembly of corporate experts.

“The government of man will be replaced by the administration of things,” the Enlightenment French philosopher Henri de Saint-Simon prophesied. We should worry that experts will channel our very instincts and thereby control them to some extent. For example, while the government fights drug abuse, often with pathetic results, pharmaceutical corporations have worked through the government and political parties to receive sanction for drugs such as stimulants and anti-depressants, whose consciousness-altering effects, it could be argued, are as great as those of outlawed drugs.
The more appliances that middle-class existence requires, the more influence their producers have over the texture of our lives. Of course, the computer in some ways enhances the power of the individual, but it also depletes our individuality. A degree of space and isolation is required for a healthy sense of self, which may be threatened by the constant stream of other people’s opinions on computer networks.

Democratic governance, at the federal, state, and local levels, goes on. But its ability to affect our lives is limited. The growing piles of our material possessions make personal life more complex and leave less time for communal matters. And as communities become liberated from geography, as well as more specialized culturally and electronically, they will increasingly fall outside the realm of traditional governance. Democracy loses meaning if both rulers and ruled cease to be part of a community tied to a specific territory. In this historical transition phase, lasting perhaps a century or more, in which globalization has begun but is not complete and loyalties are highly confused, civil society will be harder to maintain. How and when we vote during the next hundred years may be a minor detail for historians.

True, there are strong similarities between now and a century ago. In the 1880s and 1890s America experienced great social and economic upheaval. The combination of industrialization and urbanization shook the roots of religious and family life: sects sprouted, racist Populists ranted, and single women, like Theodore Dreiser’s Sister Carrie, went to work in filthy factories. Racial tensions hardened as the Jim Crow system took hold across the South. “Gadgets” like the light bulb and the automobile brought an array of new choices and stresses. “The city was so big, now, that people disappeared into it unnoticed,” Booth Tarkington lamented in The Magnificent Ambersons.

A hundred years ago millionaires’ mansions arose beside slums. The crass accumulation of wealth by a relatively small number of people gave the period its name-the Gilded Age, after a satire by Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner about financial and political malfeasance. Around the turn of the century 12 percent of all American households controlled about 86 percent of the country’s wealth. But there is a difference, and not just one of magnitude. The fortunes made from the 1 870s through the 1 890s by John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, J. P. Morgan, and others were American fortunes, anchored to a specific geographic space. The Gilded Age millionaires financed an economy of scale to fit the vast landscape that Abraham Lincoln had secured by unifying the nation in the 1860s. These millionaires funded libraries and universities and founded symphony orchestras and historical societies to consolidate their own civilization in the making. Today’s fortunes are being made in a global economic environment in which an affluent global civilization and power structure are being forged even as a large stratum of our society remains rooted in place. A few decades hence it may be hard to define an “American” city. Even J. P. Morgan was limited by the borders of the nation-state. But in the future who, or what, will limit the likes of Disney chairman Michael Eisner? The UN? Eisner and those like him are not just representatives of the “free” market. Neither the Founders nor any of the early modern philosophers ever envisioned that the free market would lead to the concentration of power and resources that many corporate executives already embody. Whereas the liberal mistake is to think that there is a program or policy to alleviate every problem in the world, the conservative flaw is to be vigilant against concentrations of power in government only-not in the private sector, where power can be wielded more secretly and sometimes more dangerously.

Umpire Regimes

This rise of corporate power occurs more readily as the masses become more indifferent and the elite less accountable. Material possessions not only focus people to ward private and away from communal life but also encourage docility. The more possessions one has, the more compromises one will make to protect them. The ancient Greeks said that the slave is someone who is intent on filling his belly, which can also mean someone who is intent on safeguarding his possessions. Aristophanes and Euripides, the late-eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson, and Tocqueville in the nineteenth century all warned that material prosperity would breed servility and withdrawal, turning people into, in Tocqueville’s words, “industrious sheep.”

In moderate doses, apathy is not necessarily harmful. I have lived and traveled in countries with both high voter turnouts and unstable politics; the low voter turnouts in the United States do not by themselves worry me. The philosopher James Harrington observed that the very indifference of most people allows for a calm and healthy political climate. Apathy, after all, often means that the political situation is healthy enough to be ignored. The last thing America needs is more voters-particularly badly educated and alienated ones-with a passion for politics. But when voter turnout decreases to around 50 percent at the same time that the middle class is spending astounding sums in gambling casinos and state lotteries, joining private health clubs, and using large amounts of stimulants and anti-depressants, one can legitimately be concerned about the state of American society.

I recently went to a basketball game at the University of Arizona. It was just a scrimmage, not even a varsity game. Yet the stadium was jammed, and three groups of cheer leaders performed. Season tickets were almost impossible to obtain, even before the team won the national championship. Donating $10,000 to $15,000 to the university puts one in a good position to accumulate enough points to be eligible for a season ticket, though someone could donate up to $100,000 and still not qualify. I have heard that which spouse gets to keep tickets can be a primary issue in Tucson divorce cases. I noticed that almost everyone in the stands was white; almost everyone playing was black. Gladiators in Rome were almost always of racial or ethnic groups different from the Romans. “There may be so little holding these southwestern communities together that a basketball team is all there is,” a Tucson newspaper editor told me. “It’s a sports team, a symphony orchestra, and a church rolled into one.” Since neither Tucson nor any other southwestern city with a big state university can find enough talent locally, he pointed out, community self-esteem becomes a matter of which city can find the largest number of talented blacks from far away to represent it.

We have become voyeurs and escapists. Many of us don’t play sports but love watching great athletes with great physical attributes. The fact that basketball and football and baseball have become big corporate business has only increased the popularity of spectator sports. Basketball in particular-so fluid, and with the players in revealing shorts and tank tops-provides the artificial excitement that mass existence “against instinct,” as the philosopher Bertrand Russell labeled our lives, requires.

Take the new kind of professional fighting, called “extreme fighting,” that has been drawing sellout crowds across the country. Combining boxing, karate, and wrestling, it has nothing fake about it-blood really flows. City and state courts have tried, often unsuccessfully, to stop it. The spectators interviewed in a CNN documentary on the new sport all appeared to be typical lower-middle and middle-class people, many of whom brought young children to the fights. Asked why they came, they said that they wanted to “see blood.” The mood of the Colosseum goes together with the age of the corporation, which offers entertainment in place of values. The Nobel laureate Czeslaw Milosz provides the definitive view on why Americans degrade themselves with mass culture: “Today man believes that there is nothing in him, so he accepts anything, even if he knows it to be bad, in order to find himself at one with others, in order not to be alone.” Of course, it is because people find so little in themselves that they fill their world with celebrities. The masses avoid important national and international news because much of it is tragic, even as they show an unlimited appetite for the details of Princess Diana’s death. This willingness to give up self and responsibility is the sine qua non for tyranny.

The classicist Sir Moses Finley ended his austere and penetrating work Politics in the Ancient World (1983) with these words:

“The ideology of a ruling class is of little use unless it is accepted by those who are being ruled, and so it was to an extraordinary degree in Rome. Then, when the ideology began to disintegrate within the elite itself, the consequence was not to broaden the political liberty among the citizenry but, on the contrary, to destroy it for everyone.”

So what about our ruling class?

I was an expatriate for many years. Most expatriates I knew had utopian liberal beliefs that meant little, since few of them had much of a real stake in any nation. Their patriotism was purely nostalgic: a French friend would be come tearful when her national anthem was played, but whenever she returned to France, she complained nonstop about the French. Increasingly, though, one can be an expatriate without living abroad. One can have Oriental rugs, foreign cuisines, eclectic tastes, exposure to foreign languages, friends overseas with whom one’s life increasingly intertwines, and special schools for the kids-all at home. Resident expatriatism, or something resembling it, could become the new secular religion of the upper middle and upper classes, fostered by communications technology. Just as religion was replaced by nationalism at the end of the Middle Ages, at the end of modern times nationalism might gradually be replaced by a combination of traditional religion, spiritualism, patriotism directed toward the planet rather than a specific country, and assorted other organized emotions. Resident expatriates might constitute an elite with limited geographic loyalty beyond their local communities, which provide them with a convenient and aesthetically pleasing environment.

An elite with little loyalty to the state and a mass society fond of gladiator entertainments form a society in which corporate Leviathans rule and democracy is hollow. James Madison in The Federalist considered a comparable situation. Madison envisioned an enormously spread-out nation, but he never envisioned a modern network of transportation that would allow us psychologically to inhabit the same national community. Thus his vision of a future United States was that of a vast geographic space with governance but without patriotism, in which the state would be a mere “umpire,” refereeing among competing interests. Regional, religious, and communal self-concern would bring about overall stability. This concept went untested, because a cohesive American identity and culture did take root. But as Americans enter a global community, and as class and racial divisions solidify, Madison’s concept is relevant anew.

There is something postmodern about this scenario, with its blend of hollow governance and fragmentation, and something ancient, too. Because of suburbanization, American communities will be increasingly segregated by race and class. The tendency both toward compromise and toward trusting institutions within a given community will be high, as in small and moderately sized European countries today, or as in ancient Greek city-states. Furthermore, prosperous suburban sprawls such as western St. Louis and western Omaha, and high-technology regions such as the Tucson-Phoenix corridor, North Carolina’s Research Triangle, and the Portland-Seattle-Vancouver area will compete with one another and with individual cities and states for overseas markets, as North America becomes a more peaceful and productive version of chaotic, warring city state Greece.

A continental regime must continue to function, because America’s edge in information warfare requires it, both to maintain and to lead a far-flung empire of sorts, as the Athenians did during the Peloponnesian War. But trouble awaits us, if only because the “triumph” of democracy in the developing world will cause great upheavals before many places settle into more practical-and, it is to be hoped, benign-hybrid regimes. In the Middle East, for instance, countries like Syria, Iraq, and the Gulf sheikhdoms-with artificial borders, rising populations, and rising numbers of working-age youths-will not instantly become stable democracies once their absolute dictators and medieval ruling families pass from the scene. As in the early centuries of Christianity, there will be a mess.

Given the surging power of corporations, the gladiator culture of the masses, and the ability of the well-off to be partly disengaged from their own countries, what will democracy under an umpire regime be like?

The Return of Oligarchy?

Surprisingly, the Founders admired the military regime of Sparta. Only in this century has Sparta been seen as the forerunner of a totalitarian state. Why shouldn’t men like Madison and George Washington have admired Sparta? Its division of power among two Kings, the elders, and the ephors (“overseers”) approximated the system of checks and balances that the Founders desired in order to prevent the emergence of another Cromwell. Of course, Sparta, like Athens, was a two-tiered system, with an oligarchic element that debated and decided issues and a mass-helots (“serfs”) in Sparta, and slaves and immigrants in Athens-that had few or no rights. Whether Sparta was a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a limited democracy-and whether Athens was oligarchic or democratic-still depends on one’s viewpoint. According to Aristotle, “Whether the few or the many rule is accidental to oligarchy and democracy-the rich are few everywhere, the poor many.” The real difference, he wrote, is that “oligarchy is to the advantage of the rich, democracy to the advantage of the poor.” By “poor” Aristotle meant laborers, landowning peasants, artisans, and so on essentially, the middle class and below.

Is it not conceivable that corporations will, like the rulers of both Sparta and Athens, project power to the advantage of the well-off while satisfying the twenty-first century servile populace with the equivalent of bread and circuses? In other words, the category of politics we live with may depend more on power relationships and the demeanor of our society than on whether we continue to hold elections. Just as Cambodia was never really democratic, despite what the State Department and the UN told us, in the future we may not be democratic, despite what the government and media increasingly dominated by corporations tell us.

Indeed, the differences between oligarchy and democracy and between ancient democracy and our own could be far subtler than we think. Modern democracy exists within a thin band of social and economic conditions, which include flexible hierarchies that allow people to move up and down the ladder. Instead of clear-cut separations between classes there are many gray shades, with most people bunched in the middle. Democracy is a fraud in many poor countries outside this narrow band: Africans want a better life and instead have been given the right to vote. As new and intimidating forms of economic and social stratification appear in a world based increasingly on the ability to handle and analyze large quantities of information, a new politics might emerge for us, too-less like the kind envisioned by progressive reformers and more like the pragmatic hybrid regimes that are bringing prosperity to developing countries.

The classicist Sir Moses Finley has noted that what re ally separated the rulers from the ruled in the ancient world was literacy: the illiterate masses were subject to the elite’s interpretation of documents. Analogous gulfs between rulers and ruled may soon emerge, not only because of differing abilities to process information and to master technology but also because of globalization itself. Already, barely literate Mexicans on the U.S. border, working in dangerous, Dickensian conditions to produce our VCRs, jeans, and toasters, earn less than 50 cents an hour, with no rights or benefits. Is that Western democracy or ancient Greek-style oligarchy?

As the size of the U.S. population and the complexity of American life spill beyond the traditional national community, creating a new world of city-states and suburbs, the distance will grow between the citizens of the new city states and the bureaucratic class of overseers in Washington. Those overseers will manage an elite volunteer military armed with information-age weapons, in a world made chaotic by the spread of democracy and its attendant neoauthoritarian heresies. We prevented the worst excesses of a “military-industrial complex” by openly fearing it, as President Dwight Eisenhower told us to do. It may be equally wise to fear a high-tech military complex today. Precisely because the technological future in North America will provide so much market and individual freedom, this productive anarchy will require the supervision of tyrannies-or else there will be no justice for any one. Liberty, after all, is inseparable from authority, as Henry Kissinger observed in A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822 (1957). A hybrid regime may await us all. The future of the Third World may finally be our own. And that brings us to a sober realization. If democracy, the crowning political achievement of the West, is gradually being transfigured, in part because of technology, then the West will suffer the same fate as earlier civilizations. Just as Rome believed it was giving final expression to the republican ideal of the Greeks, and just as medieval Kings believed they were giving final expression to the Roman ideal, we believe, as the early Christians did, that we are bringing freedom and a better life to the rest of humankind. But as the nineteenth-century Russian liberal intellectual Alexander Herzen wrote, “Modern Western thought will pass into history and be incorporated in it . . . just as our body will pass into the composition of grass, of sheep, of cutlets, and of men.” I do not mean to say that the United States is in decline. On the contrary, at the end of the twentieth century we are the very essence of creativity and dynamism. We are poised to transform ourselves into something perhaps quite different from what we imagine.

Email

Hot On The Web