{"id":132290,"date":"2012-11-12T10:00:24","date_gmt":"2012-11-12T15:00:24","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.prosebeforehos.com\/?p=132290"},"modified":"2012-12-26T16:03:21","modified_gmt":"2012-12-26T21:03:21","slug":"does-airport-security-really-make-us-safer","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.prosebeforehos.com\/article-of-the-day\/11\/12\/does-airport-security-really-make-us-safer\/","title":{"rendered":"Does Airport Security Really Make Us Safer?"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Article:<\/strong> Smoke Screening<\/a> by Charles C. Mann in Vanity Fair.<\/p>\n

The Text:<\/strong> Not until I walked with Bruce Schneier toward the mass of people unloading their laptops did it occur to me that it might not be possible for us to hang around unnoticed near Reagan National Airport\u2019s security line. Much as upscale restaurants hang mug shots of local food writers in their kitchens, I realized, the Transportation Security Administration might post photographs of Schneier, a 48-year-old cryptographer and security technologist who is probably its most relentless critic. In addition to writing books and articles, Schneier has a popular blog; a recent search for \u201cTSA\u201d in its archives elicited about 2,000 results, the vast majority of which refer to some aspect of the agency that he finds to be ineffective, invasive, incompetent, inexcusably costly, or all four.<\/p>\n

As we came by the checkpoint line, Schneier described one of these aspects: the ease with which people can pass through airport security with fake boarding passes. First, scan an old boarding pass, he said\u2014more loudly than necessary, it seemed to me. Alter it with Photoshop, then print the result with a laser printer. In his hand was an example, complete with the little squiggle the T.S.A. agent had drawn on it to indicate that it had been checked. \u201cFeeling safer?\u201d he asked.<\/p>\n

Ten years ago, 19 men armed with utility knives hijacked four airplanes and within a few hours killed nearly 3,000 people. At a stroke, Americans were thrust into a menacing new world. \u201cThey are coming after us,\u201d C.I.A. director George Tenet said of al-Qaeda. \u201cThey intend to strike this homeland again, and we better get about the business of putting the right structure in place as fast as we can.\u201d<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

The United States tried to do just that. Federal and state governments embarked on a nationwide safety upgrade. Checkpoints proliferated in airports, train stations, and office buildings. A digital panopticon of radiation scanners, chemical sensors, and closed-circuit television cameras audited the movements of shipping containers, airborne chemicals, and ordinary Americans. None of this was or will be cheap. Since 9\/11, the U.S. has spent more than $1.1 trillion on homeland security.<\/p>\n

To a large number of security analysts, this expenditure makes no sense. The vast cost is not worth the infinitesimal benefit. Not only has the actual threat from terror been exaggerated, they say, but the great bulk of the post-9\/11 measures to contain it are little more than what Schneier mocks as \u201csecurity theater\u201d: actions that accomplish nothing but are designed to make the government look like it is on the job. In fact, the continuing expenditure on security may actually have made the United States less safe.<\/p>\n

The first time I met Schneier, a few months after 9\/11, he wanted to bet me a very expensive dinner that the United States would not be hit by a major terrorist attack in the next 10 years. We were in Washington, D.C., visiting one of the offices of Counterpane Internet Security, the company he had co-founded in 1999. (BT, the former British Telecom, bought Counterpane seven years later; officially, Schneier is now BT\u2019s chief security technology officer.) The bet seemed foolhardy to me. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had just told The Washington Times that al-Qaeda was dispersing its killers all over the world.<\/p>\n

From an airplane-hijacking point of view, Schneier said, al-Qaeda had used up its luck. Passengers on the first three 9\/11 flights didn\u2019t resist their captors, because in the past the typical consequence of a plane seizure had been \u201ca week in Havana.\u201d When the people on the fourth hijacked plane learned by cell phone that the previous flights had been turned into airborne bombs, they attacked their attackers. The hijackers were forced to crash Flight 93 into a field. \u201cNo big plane will ever be taken that way again, because the passengers will fight back,\u201d Schneier said. Events have borne him out. The instigators of the two most serious post-9\/11 incidents involving airplanes\u2014 the \u201cshoe bomber\u201d in 2001 and the \u201cunderwear bomber\u201d in 2009, both of whom managed to get onto an airplane with explosives\u2014were subdued by angry passengers.<\/p>\n

Schneier\u2019s sanguine views had little resonance at a time when the fall of the twin towers was being replayed nightly on the news. Two months after 9\/11, the Bush administration created the Transportation Security Agency, ordering it to hire and train enough security officers to staff the nation\u2019s 450 airports within a year. Six months after that, the government vastly expanded the federal sky-marshal program, sending thousands of armed lawmen to ride planes undercover. Meanwhile, the T.S.A. steadily ratcheted up the existing baggage-screening program, banning cigarette lighters from carry-on bags, then all liquids (even, briefly, breast milk from some nursing mothers). Signs were put up in airports warning passengers about specifically prohibited items: snow globes, printer cartridges. A color-coded alert system was devised; the nation was placed on \u201corange alert\u201d for five consecutive years. Washington assembled a list of potential terror targets that soon swelled to 80,000 places, including local libraries and miniature-golf courses. Accompanying the target list was a watch list of potential suspects that had grown to 1.1 million names by 2008, the most recent date for which figures are available. Last year, the Department of Homeland Security, which absorbed the T.S.A. in 2003, began deploying full-body scanners, which peer through clothing to produce nearly nude images of air passengers.<\/p>\n

Bruce Schneier\u2019s exasperation is informed by his job-related need to spend a lot of time in Airportland. He has 10 million frequent-flier miles and takes about 170 flights a year; his average speed, he has calculated, is 32 miles and hour. \u201cThe only useful airport security measures since 9\/11,\u201d he says, \u201cwere locking and reinforcing the cockpit doors, so terrorists can\u2019t break in, positive baggage matching\u201d\u2014ensuring that people can\u2019t put luggage on planes, and then not board them \u2014\u201cand teaching the passengers to fight back. The rest is security theater.\u201d<\/p>\n

Remember the fake boarding pass that was in Schneier\u2019s hand? Actually, it was mine. I had flown to meet Schneier at Reagan National Airport because I wanted to view the security there through his eyes. He landed on a Delta flight in the next terminal over. To reach him, I would have to pass through security. The day before, I had downloaded an image of a boarding pass from the Delta Web site, copied and pasted the letters with Photoshop, and printed the results with a laser printer. I am not a photo-doctoring expert, so the work took me nearly an hour. The T.S.A. agent waved me through without a word. A few minutes later, Schneier deplaned, compact and lithe, in a purple shirt and with a floppy cap drooping over a graying ponytail.<\/p>\n

The boarding-pass problem is hardly the only problem with the checkpoints. Taking off your shoes is next to useless. \u201cIt\u2019s like saying, Last time the terrorists wore red shirts, so now we\u2019re going to ban red shirts,\u201d Schneier says. If the T.S.A. focuses on shoes, terrorists will put their explosives elsewhere. \u201cFocusing on specific threats like shoe bombs or snow-globe bombs simply induces the bad guys to do something else. You end up spending a lot on the screening and you haven\u2019t reduced the total threat.\u201d<\/p>\n

As I waited at security with my fake boarding pass, a T.S.A. agent had darted out and swabbed my hands with a damp, chemically impregnated cloth: a test for explosives. Schneier said, \u201cApparently the idea is that al-Qaeda has never heard of latex gloves and wiping down with alcohol.\u201d The uselessness of the swab, in his view, exemplifies why Americans should dismiss the T.S.A.\u2019s frequent claim that it relies on \u201cmultiple levels\u201d of security. For the extra levels of protection to be useful, each would have to test some factor that is independent of the others. But anyone with the intelligence and savvy to use a laser printer to forge a boarding pass can also pick up a stash of latex gloves to wear while making a bomb. From the standpoint of security, Schneier said, examining boarding passes and swabbing hands are tantamount to performing the same test twice because the person you miss with one test is the same person you’ll miss with the other.<\/p>\n

After a public outcry, T.S.A. officers began waving through medical supplies that happen to be liquid, including bottles of saline solution. \u201cYou fill one of them up with liquid explosive,\u201d Schneier said, \u201cthen get a shrink-wrap gun and seal it. The T.S.A. doesn\u2019t open shrink-wrapped packages.\u201d I asked Schneier if he thought terrorists would in fact try this approach. Not really, he said. Quite likely, they wouldn\u2019t go through the checkpoint at all. The security bottlenecks are regularly bypassed by large numbers of people\u2014airport workers, concession-stand employees, airline personnel, and T.S.A. agents themselves (though in 2008 the T.S.A. launched an employee-screening pilot study at seven airports). \u201cAlmost all of those jobs are crappy, low-paid jobs,\u201d Schneier says. \u201cThey have high turnover. If you\u2019re a serious plotter, don\u2019t you think you could get one of those jobs?\u201d<\/p>\n

The full-body-scanner program\u2014some 1,800 scanners operating in every airport in the country\u2014was launched in response to the \u201cunderwear bomber\u201d incident on Christmas Day in 2009, when a Nigerian Muslim hid the plastic explosive petn in his briefs and tried to detonate it on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit. It has an annual price tag of $1.2 billion. The scanners cannot detect petn directly; instead they look for suspicious bulges under clothing. Because petn is a Silly Putty\u2013like material, it can be fashioned into a thin pancake. Taped flat to the stomach, the pancake is invisible to scanning machines. Alternatively, attackers could stick gum-size wads of the explosive in their mouths, then go through security enough times to accumulate the desired amount.<\/p>\n

Staffing the airport checkpoints, at least in theory, are \u201cbehavioral detection officers,\u201d supposedly trained in reading the \u201cfacial microexpressions\u201d that give away terrorists. It is possible that they are effective, Schneier says\u2014nobody knows exactly what they do. But U.S. airlines carried approximately 700 million passengers in 2010. In the last 10 years, there have been 20 known full-fledged al-Qaeda operatives who flew on U.S. planes (the 9\/11 hijackers and the underwear bomber, who was given explosives by a Yemeni al-Qaeda affiliate). Picking the right 20 out of 700 million is simply not possible, Schneier says.<\/p>\n

After the airport checkpoint, an additional layer of security is provided, in theory, by air marshals. At an annual cost of about $1.2 billion, as many as 4,000 plainclothes police ride the nation\u2019s airways\u2014usually in first class, so that they can monitor the cockpit. John Mueller, co-author of Terror, Security, and Money, a great book from which I drew much information for this article, says it’s a horrible job. \u201cYou sit there and fly and you can\u2019t even drink or listen to music, because you can\u2019t have headphones on. You have to stay awake. You are basically just sitting there, day after day.\u201d Unsurprisingly, there\u2019s a lot of turnover\u2014\u201cyou\u2019re constantly training people, which is expensive.\u201d Worse, the program has had no measurable benefit. Air marshals have not saved a single life, although one of them did shoot a deranged passenger a few years ago.<\/p>\n

Has the nation simply wasted a trillion dollars protecting itself against terror? Mostly, but perhaps not entirely. \u201cMost of the time we assess risk through gut feelings,\u201d says Paul Slovic, a psychology professor at the University of Oregon who is also the president of Decision Research, a nonprofit R&D organization. \u201cWe\u2019re not robots just looking at the numbers.\u201d Confronted with a risk, people ask questions: Is this a risk that I benefit from taking, as when I get in a car? Is it forced on me by someone else, as when I am exposed to radiation? Are the potential consequences catastrophic? Is the impact immediate and observable, or will I not know the consequences until much later, as with cancer? Such questions, Slovic says, \u201creflect values that are sometimes left out of the experts\u2019 calculations.\u201d<\/p>\n

Security theater, from this perspective, is an attempt to convey a message: \u201cWe are doing everything possible to protect you.\u201d When 9\/11 shattered the public\u2019s confidence in flying, Slovic says, the handful of anti-terror measures that actually work\u2014hardening the cockpit door, positive baggage matching, more-effective intelligence\u2014would not have addressed the public\u2019s dread, because the measures can\u2019t really be seen. Relying on them would have been the equivalent of saying, \u201cHave confidence in Uncle Sam,\u201d when the problem was the very loss of confidence. So a certain amount of theater made sense. Over time, though, the value of the message changes. At first the policeman in the train station reassures you. Later, the uniform sends a message: train travel is dangerous. \u201cThe show gets less effective, and sometimes it becomes counterproductive.\u201d<\/p>\n

Terrorists will try to hit the United States again, Schneier says. One has to assume this. Terrorists can so easily switch from target to target and weapon to weapon that focusing on preventing any one type of attack is foolish. Even if the T.S.A. were somehow to make airports impregnable, this would simply divert terrorists to other, less heavily defended targets\u2014shopping malls, movie theaters, churches, stadiums, museums. The terrorist\u2019s goal isn\u2019t to attack an airplane specifically; it\u2019s to sow terror generally. \u201cYou spend billions of dollars on the airports and force the terrorists to spend an extra $30 on gas to drive to a hotel or casino and attack it,\u201d Schneier says. \u201cCongratulations!\u201d<\/p>\n

What the government should be doing is focusing on the terrorists when they are planning their plots. \u201cThat\u2019s how the British caught the liquid bombers,\u201d Schneier says. \u201cThey never got anywhere near the plane. That\u2019s what you want\u2014not catching them at the last minute as they try to board the flight.\u201d<\/p>\n

To walk through an airport with Bruce Schneier is to see how much change a trillion dollars can wreak. So much inconvenience for so little benefit at such a staggering cost. And directed against a threat that, by any objective standard, is quite modest. Since 9\/11, Islamic terrorists have killed just 17 people on American soil, all but four of them victims of an army major turned fanatic who shot fellow soldiers in a rampage at Fort Hood. (The other four were killed by lone-wolf assassins.) During that same period, 200 times as many Americans drowned in their bathtubs. Still more were killed by driving their cars into deer. The best memorial to the victims of 9\/11, in Schneier\u2019s view, would be to forget most of the \u201clessons\u201d of 9\/11. \u201cIt\u2019s infuriating,\u201d he said, waving my fraudulent boarding pass to indicate the mass of waiting passengers, the humming X-ray machines, the piles of unloaded computers and cell phones on the conveyor belts, the uniformed T.S.A. officers instructing people to remove their shoes and take loose change from their pockets. \u201cWe\u2019re spending billions upon billions of dollars doing this\u2014and it is almost entirely pointless. Not only is it not done right, but even if it was done right it would be the wrong thing to do.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Article: Smoke Screening by Charles C. Mann in Vanity Fair. The Text: Not until I walked with Bruce Schneier toward the mass of people unloading their laptops did it occur to me that it might not be possible for us to hang around unnoticed near Reagan National Airport\u2019s security line. Much as upscale restaurants […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":49,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[259],"tags":[],"yoast_head":"\nDoes Airport Security Really Make Us Safer?<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"As you stand in endless lines this holiday season, here\u2019s a comforting thought: all those security measures accomplish nothing, at enormous cost.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.prosebeforehos.com\/article-of-the-day\/11\/12\/does-airport-security-really-make-us-safer\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Does Airport Security Really Make Us Safer?\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" 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